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Introduction
Social investment!  Ethical investment!  Social enterprising!  Corporate social 
responsibility!  Triple bottom line! Those have become popular terms among leading 
entrepreneurs and investors. Today, more than ever before, social objectives are 
deliberately pursued and honored.  Investors in microﬁnance institutions are no 
exception. Social performance of investments has become a topical issue as the list of 
events presented in the table below indicates. 
    Table 1: The agenda of events where social investors discuss social performance:
- November 2006: Investors in microﬁnance gathered under the umbrella of 
the European Microﬁnance Platform to exchange on how social investors 
can practice social performance management. 
- March 2007: a group of social investors in microﬁnance, most of them 
headquartered in Switzerland, were mobilized by SDC.  They discussed in 
Bern how to measure social performance and how to report on it.  
- The summer of 2007: The Social Investor Subcommittee of the 
international Social Performance Task Force initiated by Ford Foundation, 
Argidius Foundation and CGAP, interviewed 45 social investors on their 
practices, perceptions and preferences regarding social performance and 
indicators to measure.
- November 2007:  Social investors exchanged again on social performance 
at the European week of the European Microﬁnance Platform in 
Luxembourg. 
The Role of Investors in 
Promoting Social Performance in 
Microfinance
BART DE BRUYNE, TRIAS
KOENRAAD  VERHAGEN, CONSULTANT 
Améliorer le contrôle interne
pI4
e-MFP European Dialogue, N°01, 2008
- June 2008: During the next meeting of the international SP Task Force on 
17 and 18 June in Paris, the outcome of the ‘Testing a Social Performance 
Format’ and indicators by 50 MFIs will be discussed. From this testing and 
the earlier mentioned survey and consultations of Social Investors, key 
indicators will emerge that could ﬁt within a global system of reporting not 
only to the MIX1, but also to MIVs, Funds and Donor agencies.
Planned meetings: From June onwards the program is not yet completely 
deﬁned. One important Dutch Social Investor is considering bringing 
together a group of Investors to discuss the follow-up to the Paris meeting, 
while the e-MPF Social Performance Working Group will devote a session 
to SP reporting and key indicators during the European Microﬁnance Week 
scheduled for 12-14 November, 2008.
This publication provides an overview on the results of the above surveys and meetings 
and presents some selected cases that illustrate how social investors integrate social 
performance governance and management in their daily operations. 
Before presenting the cases of social investors in microﬁnance, we would like to 
provide some general concepts of social performance management and how this is 
implemented ‘in the ﬁeld’ by microﬁnance institutions.
The need for social performance management 
Speciﬁc to microﬁnance is that it has social objectives at its core.  Most microﬁnance 
institutions are created with aims to reduce poverty, to create employment, to improve 
social capital or to empower marginal groups.    
However, microﬁnance is also criticized.  Are social objectives achieved or are they paper 
promises, useful for public relations?  New microﬁnance methods in banking with the 
poor have proven to be proﬁtable.  But accessing the poor does not necessarily mean 
improving their situation. Recent publications2 based on impact studies illustrate some 
1 The MIX Market is the global microﬁnance marketplace, providing ﬁnancial data and proﬁles on 
microﬁnance institutions and the microﬁnance sector on the Internet, at http:www.themix.org
2 See the well documented book ’What ‘s Wrong with Microﬁnance ? (Editors: Thomas Dichter and 
Malcolm Harper, Practical Action Publishing,UK) and the discussions on international ‘list serves’ 
like DevFinance, moderated by Ohio Unversity, <devﬁnance@lists.acs.ohio-state.edu>, and MFP 
(MicroFinance Practitioners) moderated by Chuck Waterﬁeld and Howard Brady <MicroﬁnancePra
ctice@yahoogroups.com> 
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of the pitfalls of microﬁnance: how microﬁnance, especially microcredit, can create 
over-indebtedness, increased social pressure and increased work load of women, with 
little impact on employment creation and enterprise development. The topic became 
disputed again, end 2007, when Compartamos, a Mexican MFI, went to the stock 
market and created a high return on investment for its shareholders, while operating 
with high interest rates charged to poor clients.  
It might be true that some microﬁnance institutions have been concerned too much with 
proﬁtability and ﬁnancial viability, forgetting about developmental effects.  However, 
the great majority of the microﬁnance institutions are genuinely concerned about their 
social mission. Also numerous studies testify the high potential and positive impact of 
microﬁnance in poverty alleviation, even poverty eradication and the build-up of social 
capital at community level.  From the practitioners’ point of view, even more importantly 
than the effort of proving the success of microﬁnance, is the daily effort to improve the 
quality of their services for the sake of their clients, including those who are regarded 
as poor or even the poorest. In other words, in social performance management, the 
focus became less and less to prove that operations generate impact, but to secure 
systems that improve and maximize possible impact.  This is based on the premises and 
growing awareness among microﬁnance providers that poverty outreach and socially 
relevant results cannot be taken ‘for granted’ and are not generated spontaneously. It 
requires careful management to achieve social objectives, speciﬁc targeting to reach 
the desired target groups, offering adapted services  to overcome speciﬁc limitations 
of rural, poor or remote groups, alternative guarantee systems, attention for client feed 
back, surveys on clients drop-out, etc. 
Social performance management can be deﬁned as the whole process within 
microﬁnance institutions that puts the realization of a social mission into practice.
Social performance looks at the entire process by which impact is created. It therefore 
includes analysis of the declared objectives of institutions, the effectiveness of their 
systems and services in meeting these objectives, related outputs (for example, 
reaching larger numbers of very poor households) and indeed success in effecting 
positive changes in the lives of clients. 
The Role of Investors in Promoting Social 
Performance in Microfinance
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SOCIAL PERFORMANCE FRAMEWORK
INTENT AND DESIGN
What is the mission of the MFI?
Does it have clear social objectives, and are systems designed to achieve 
those objectives?

ACTIVITIES AND OPERATIONS
What activities will the MFI undertake to achieve the mission? 

OUTPUT
Does the MFI serve the desired clients ? 
Are the products designed to meet their needs?  

OUTCOME / IMPACT
Have MFI clients experienced social and economic improvement?
       Source: http://www.microﬁnancegateway.com/resource_centers/socialperformance
How do MFIs practice social performance management? The case of TRIAS 
Some examples derived from TRIAS experiences might illustrate how MFIs invest in 
improving their social performance management. TRIAS is a Belgian NGO, supporting 
local economic development ‘at the bottom of the pyramid’. As such TRIAS supports a 
range of microﬁnance institutions in 12 countries and examines, in consultation with 
the MFI, the following questions: 
• Are social objectives clear and systems designed to achieve those objectives? 
For example, the objective may be to bring adapted services to rural farmers 
living in remote areas.  UCAC CENTRO in Equator has that objective and unites 
cooperatives in exchange discussions and a common reﬂection on the type of 
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structure and products that best reaches the more remote places.  For instance 
rural ‘windows’ were developed that allowed savings and credit groups some level 
of self-management  under supervision of stronger  savings and credit associations, 
based in the near cities.
• What activities does the MFI undertake to achieve its mission? Cre$ol in Brazil 
promotes agricultural production by smaller family farmers.  Government credit 
lines are channeled to those groups that before hardly proﬁted from this kind of 
government support.  Cre$ol stimulates them with special credit products and 
conditions to go into organic farming, etc.
• Does the MFI serve the desired clients? ASHI likes to reach out to the poorest of 
the poor in the Philippines. To check upon their outreach they do ‘means’ testing. 
They map potential intervention through housing quality data and select those 
areas with a high concentration of core poverty.  Then, they select clients based 
on data about housing, asset ownership and income resources
• Are the products designed to meet their demands and needs? To be aware of what is 
really important for clients, it is best explained by themselves.  Pilarh, in Honduras 
went through a long process to integrate representatives of the poor coffee growing 
communities into its board of trustees.  Beside direct client representation, there 
are numerous other ways to guarantee client feed back in an institutionalized way. 
For instance, ASHI organizes regularly open feed back meetings where clients get 
the opportunity to ask their questions to management and board members. 
• Have MFI clients experienced social and economic improvement? A sign of 
failing impact can be if clients drop out of the system. Being alert for drop outs, 
researching why they drop out and subsequently, addressing those issues, helps to 
ensure impact.  
During the last ﬁve years, more and more tools have been developed that support MFIs 
in managing better their social performance.  The Social Performance Task Force was 
created in 2005 to bring together all those efforts and optimize further progress on 
social performance tools . Some of the most striking tools3 discussed are4: 
• The SPI tool (Social Performance Indicators) developed by Cerise.  The SPI 
tool evaluates four dimensions of social performance: (1) outreach to the poor 
and excluded populations, (2) adaptation of products and services for target 
clients, (3) economic and social beneﬁts for the clients, and (4) corporate social 
responsibility towards the clients, the staff, the community and the environment. 
The Role of Investors in Promoting Social 
Performance in Microfinance
3 Detailed information on various tools can be found at the social performance resource centre at the 
Microﬁnance Gateway: http://www.microﬁnancegateway.com/resource_centers/socialperformance
4 SEEP developed a consumer guide with descriptions of the most used tools.  They discuss 28 
tools.
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The questionnaire is a checklist of about 60 basic indicators quantiﬁable to assess 
the whole process of social performance management. The promotion, application, 
and training in this approach is done by the newly created network ProsperA.5
• The Progress out of Poverty Index (PPI) links some basic, observable poverty 
indicators at client level to deeper national poverty studies.  A simple, inexpensive, 
poverty score card estimates the likelihood that a client is poor, allows to track 
changes in poverty over time, and assess its level of poverty compared to deﬁned 
national or international poverty lines.6
• Elements out of the AIMS-impact measurement package, such as the interviews 
to assess drop out reasons or to assess client satisfaction.7
• Social Raters such as M-CRIL, MicroFinanza Rating, Planet Rating and MicroRate, 
working together in a sub-committee of the Social Performance Task Group,  are 
currently developing and piloting social rating products.8
• A workgroup within the social performance task force is deﬁning social core 
indicators that will be integrated in the reporting schedules of the MIX-market and 
as such create a database with reference material on social performance of MFIs.
• Like the earlier mentioned Cerise group, the Imp-Act consortium has been very 
active in  concept development, production of guidelines on how to design a SPM 
system and select the most appropriate tools, as well as capacity building through 
a range of training activities.9
How about social performance management for social investors? 
When considering social performance for social investors core questions are:  
• Which selection procedures guarantee the most optimal social orientation of the 
funds in a cost realistic way?  
• How can social investors make sure that their products and set conditions best ﬁt 
the needs of socially managed MFIs? 
• What incentives can social investors build into their own systems that stimulate 
MFIs to further improve on their social management or to care more about 
environmental issues during credit allocation? 
5 For more information, go to www.cerise-microﬁnance.org 
6 For more information, go to http://www.microﬁnance.com/#Poverty_Scoring  ; USAID-IRIS 
also developed the same type of tools: http://www.povertytools.org/ 
7 For more information, go to www.seepnetwork.org/content/library/detail/646
8 See ‘Social Performance Progress Brief, No. 4  on ‘Social Rating’ , a SEEP network/Argidius 
Foundation publication, www.seepnetwork.org
9 For more information, see www.imp-act.org
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• How can social investors be transparent on the social proﬁle of their total 
portfolio? 
Private investors are increasingly entering the MF capital market, some as ‘retail 
investors’ with small amounts. Others, sometimes guided by special advisors, dispose 
of bigger amounts.  The latter regard MF investments as a special asset class of socially 
responsible investment.10 Social investors do not only aim at return on investment, but 
they like to see also some (preferably demonstrated) social return on investment.  The 
main challenge is to ensure that capital ﬂows to destinations and organizations where 
optimal social return can be obtained. If not properly monitored there is a risk that 
capital concentrates around the most proﬁtable market segments in low-risk countries 
with stable currencies, which are not necessarily the places where the highest return 
can be obtained in social terms.
In this publication, cases of some investors that participated at the eMFP-social 
performance working group or at the exchanges organized by SDC in Bern are presented. 
Those cases are not an exhaustive list and other investors may also have valuable 
experiences that can be shared at another time.  They show how social investors respond 
and search for answers on the above core questions.  For instance, the highlights of the 
workshop on “Pushing the frontiers of performance reporting” present the discussions 
and exchanges of investors in March 2007, on their questions and practices, with 
specimen cases such as responsAbility fund. The cases of the Belgian organizations 
Incoﬁn and Alterﬁn demonstrate in a detailed way how they screen MFIs on their 
social performance. Triodos bank, a Dutch private bank and FMO, administering public 
money, stimulate MFIs to consider social and environmental aspects in credit activities 
and day-to-day management practice. Paris-based Sidi explains how they work with the 
MFIs to improve their social performance and ensuring the ‘viabilité humaine’ of a MFI 
with an example of Peru. Oikocredit illustrates how they build up an internal database 
that provides them with overall information on the social proﬁle of their investments, 
while EFSE (the European Fund for Southeast Europe) explains how it promotes social 
and environmental performance of lending institutions by setting standards, regular 
monitoring and conducting studies. 
Until the above mentioned Bern Workshop and the Social Performance Working group 
meetings of the European Microﬁnance Platform, there had been little direct involvement 
of microﬁnance investors in the conception of Social Performance, design of formats 
for measurement and management, ﬁeld testing, and international consultations. 
Those meetings were organized with the purpose to change that situation. However, it 
was a surprise for both organizers and participants to learn about the internal policies 
10 Typically ‘retail investor’ funds are the Triodos Fair Share Fund, and the funds associated to the 
Oikocredit network. Big private investors often work through foundations.
The Role of Investors in Promoting Social 
Performance in Microfinance
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and work already accomplished by some social investors with a view of strengthening 
the social and environmental impact of international funding.  
The case studies of the European Dialogue provide a rich overview on what social 
investors actually do to make sure they invest in a socially correct way. This Dialogue is 
open, and will be pursued with the different actors who want Social Performance to be 
promoted and strengthened at different levels of the microﬁnance chain.
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Highlights of a workshop for Microﬁnance Investment Vehicles 
(MIVs) and Investors, March 2007, Bern, Switzerland
On March 29-30 2007 in Bern, SDC (Swiss Development Cooperation) and SECO 
(Staatssekretariat für Wirtschaft) organised a workshop12 on “Pushing the Frontier 
of Performance Reporting of Microﬁnance”. It was the ﬁrst one ever organized for 
microﬁnance Investment Vehicles (MIVs) and Microﬁnance Investors with a focus on 
social performance in Microﬁnance rather than ﬁnancial performance. The workshop 
brought together 26 delegates from: 
• MIVs that manage and allocate funds,
• Private and public investors providing the funds, and
• Microﬁnance investment advisers and microﬁnance rating agencies13. 
The overall goal of the workshop was to work towards consensus and transparency in 
MIV reporting, so as to reﬂect - and improve - the ‘triple bottom line’ in microﬁnance. 
Greater transparency is believed to lead to better performance in those areas where it 
exists.
For the MIV/Investor participants the workshop was an opportunity:
• To share and review current experience and ‘good’ practice in social performance 
assessment and reporting of MFIs.
11 Member of the Argidius Foundation Investment Committee
12 The programme, all presentations and selected background materials can be downloaded at: www.
intercooperation.ch/ﬁnance
13 List of participants by organisation: Alternative Bank (ABS), Argidius Foundation, Balkan 
Equity Fund, Bank Sarasin & Co. Ltd., BlueOrchard Finance S.A., CGAP, Credit Suisse, de Pury 
Pictet Turrettini & Cie.SA, EDA / M-CRIL, EFSE / Bankakademie e.V., FACET, FIDES, INCOFIN, 
Intercooperation, KfW, MicroFinanza Rating, Respons Ability / Social Investment Services AG, 
SDC, seco, ShoreCap/ShoreBank group, SIFEM, Symbiotics sa, Triodos Bank.
pI12
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• To provide feedback on key indicators of social and environmental performance 
in microﬁnance, as a contribution to the current debate around key development 
indicators and MFI reporting.
This article summarizes the main exchanges and conclusions of the workshop.
1. Context
There are fundamental social goals and values that drive practice and investment in 
microﬁnance.
Until recently the industry has lacked the concepts and the tools to report effectively 
on whether microﬁnance - the delivery of ﬁnancial services to the low income and poor 
sections of the population - is meeting its social goals and expectations. Impact studies 
have shown to be important and informative, but need long-term research, proved to be 
very costly, while study process and ﬁndings in general, were not considered by MFIs 
as very helpful for improving practice. 
Over the past 4 years this situation has dramatically changed. Many actors in the 
MF sector have tested new approaches of Social Performance (SP) Management, 
Measurement and Governance with the aim to improve SP. The basic assumption is 
that better institutional SP will lead to greater Social Impact. 
In parallel, Social Rating has become more widely practiced and shown its usefulness. 
Increasingly, MIVs are encouraged to reﬂect and report on their social performance. 
In this context, MIVs/Investors have an important role to play. They can promote and 
facilitate the practice of SP management at MFI level by inclusion of SP in due diligence 
and reporting requirements, and adoption of the practice of social audit and rating.
Attendance of  the workshop by leading MIVs and Investors reﬂects the genuine interest 
on their part to contribute towards greater social transparency of the MF sector, and be 
better equipped to  inform social investors on the ‘social return’ of their investments.
pI13
2. Conceptual framework of social performance
    The international Social Performance Task Force deﬁnes social performance as:14 
«The effective translation of an institution’s social mission into practice in line 
with accepted social values that relate to serving larger numbers of poor and 
excluded people; improving the quality and appropriateness of ﬁnancial services; 
creating beneﬁts for clients; and improving social responsibility of an MFI.»
A common framework has also been developed that draws on the different initiatives 
around measuring and managing social performance in microﬁnance, and the 
deliberations of the Social Performance Task Force (SPTF) and which is based on a 
common understanding that social performance is not restricted to the measurement 
of results, but also relates to the processes in place within organisations that leads to 
social impact.  This common understanding can be highlighted a follows:
• The deﬁnition of social performance, as indicated above,  in line with accepted 
social values 
• Social performance as both process (mission and leadership, organisational 
systems) and outputs/results (reaching target clients, providing appropriate 
services) to achieve social goals (outcomes/impact).
• Financial performance is not an end in itself but the means to achieve social 
results.
3.  Microﬁnance investment landscape and the CGAP MIV reporting initiative
3.1. The landscape
A study from CGAP highlighted the more than 300% growth of foreign microﬁnance 
investments between 2004 and 2006 reaching around US$ 4 billion at the end of 
2006.15   MIV investments surpassed those of the International Financial Institutions 
(IFIs16) with US$ 2,2 compared to US$ 1,8 billion. It was explained that ‘best practice’ 
ﬁnancial reporting exists only at the MFI level, but was still missing at MIV level. There 
‘Pushing the Frontier of Performance
Reporting of Microfinance’ 
14 Deﬁnition agreed upon by the international SP Task Force, for further details, see http://www.
microﬁnancegateway.org/resource_centers/socialperformance/deﬁnition.
15 Figures updated from CGAP Focus Note no.44, Febr. 2008 
16 IFIs, also named  DFIs (Development  Financing Institutions), are the private-sector arms of 
government –owned development institutions such as SECO, KfW, FMO etc.
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are currently 74 MIVs active in MF, but overall they show little transparency. MIVs 
with public funds are providing more information than MIVs with private funds only.  A 
tentative framework for MIV ﬁnancial performance reporting was presented that also 
included some social indicators.17 
3.2. The CGAP MIV reporting initiative
The initiative covers guidelines for both ﬁnancial and social reporting. Since 2006, 
the guidelines have been developed by CGAP following a request by several investors. 
Participants reviewed particularly the outreach indicators, as they reﬂect a development 
dimension compared to the other ﬁnancial performance indicators. 
Several other suggestions were made on outlay and creating space for variations 
according to the vision/mission of the MFI. The above comments and suggestions have 
been incorporated into the ﬁnal report of the MIV performance reporting initiative (see 
Reporting and Performance Indicators for Microﬁnance Investment Vehicles18). In the 
light of further experiences and discussions the social indicators may need further 
adjustment. 
4. MIV social reporting; the current state of affairs
4. 1. Overview 
In preparation of the Workshop, a desk/internet review of public documents of 45 MIVs 
had been conducted related to their statement of mission and reporting. The ﬁndings 
were that:
• 41 MIVs include social aspects in their mission/principles: mainly ﬁnancial inclusion 
(59%), development impact (49%), enterprise and employment promotion (32%), 
poverty reduction (27%) and socially responsible investment (22%).
• 28 (two-thirds) MIVs specify a target group: 46% specify poor / low-income clients, 
32% micro enterprises, 16% SMEs.
• All MIVs emphasise numbers (probably loan accounts rather than clients) and 
growth; 26 refer to social indicators; rely on loan size for ‘depth’ of outreach. 
It seems that most investors have a double bottom line objective. They aim at reaching 
an acceptable ﬁnancial return while having a positive social impact.  This highlights 
current opportunities for ‘pushing the frontier’ in social reporting. Investors/ fund 
17 Eventually, the CGAP ‘MIV reporting initiative’ and the social indicators reporting initiative of the 
international SP Task Force , will be part of  a comprehensive  integrated framework  
18 http://microﬁnancegateway.org/content/article/detail/37272
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providers can support this development, depending on the issues they ask to be 
informed about. 
4.2. Four cases of social and environmental reporting by MIVs/Banks
Four cases were presented 
• ResponsAbility is the ﬁrst MIV to have produced an annual ‘Social Performance 
Report’ for 2006 and 2007 ( see special box).
• Triodos (see article 7) & Shorebank: These two banks have a strong value orientation. 
Social and environmental concern is reﬂected in annual reports. Triodos Bank inspired 
by GRI (Global Reporting Initiative) promotes a model of reporting that ﬁts into the 
GRI. Shorebank is inspired by Community banking. It is involved in a pioneer project 
with BRAC in Bangladesh to track employment and poverty effects of small enterprise 
lending.   
• EFSE, largest MIV worldwide (Eur 430 million) (see article 9): Investment appraisal 
and monitoring process give weight to social policies and practice of investees ( i.e. 
outreach to target groups, social environmental standards, salary level of staff)
The four case studies show great diversity in dimensions and indicators covered.  Their 
pioneering initiatives are not well known in the microﬁnance industry.
ResponsAbility : The ﬁrst MIV to produce a ‘Social Performance Report’
ResponsAbility ( RsA), an initiative sponsored by four Swiss banks and a private social 
investment fund, is dedicated to foster private sector involvement in social investment. 
It manages several funds. The oldest, and so far biggest, is the responsAbility Global 
Microﬁnance Fund (rAGMF) with a volume of UDS 218 million (March 2008). The 
monthly reports of the fund are accessible on internet (www.responsability.com) and 
show, next to ﬁnancial data , the following selected social indicators:  
“ Local impact indicators (Monthly report February 2008)
Number of clients of MF institutions 4’420’000 
Microentrepreneurs reached
- by rAGMF ( the Fund)  211’000
with an investment of USD 10’000  10
- % rural / urban clients   46 / 54
- % female / male clients    54 / 46
- Average loan disbursed in USD   1,000
Remarks: Some calculations are based on assumptions by ResponsAbility. Figures 
represent approximations. 
‘Pushing the Frontier of Performance
Reporting of Microfinance’ 
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ResponsAbility invests directly in MFIs, but also works as a ‘fund of funds’ through 
‘Investment partners’ (Alterﬁn, Blue Orchard Finance s.a., ProCredit Holding AG, 
FINCA International, Opportunity International, PlaNet Finance). This means that the 
information on Social Performance of funds also depends on the type and quality of 
data provided by its partners and their systems of data collection. 
Since 2005, ResponsAbility produces a yearly ‘Social Performance Report’ of the 
fund, which gives further details on ‘key indicators’, types of businesses ﬁnanced, 
geographic allocation of funds, and illustrates the variety in policies and practices of 
MFI institutions which ‘go different paths’. 
Other documents on ResponsAbility’s website testify of a social concern that goes beyond 
‘social responsibility’. The following is a selection from its  ‘Guiding Principles’: 
 “The investment strategy … aims at achieving the highest possible social impact of 
investments by strongly focusing on outreach”. 
“ We invest in both larger, more mature MFIs (so-called MFI Leaders) from which we 
expect ﬁnancial returns that reﬂect true risk levels, as well as in smaller, innovative 
MFIs with a strong contribution to social impact (MFI Pioneers)”. 
Other sections of the guiding principles reﬂect investment policies that favour rural 
areas, welcome MFIs with a major share of women clients, refrain from “mission drift”, 
and monitor clients’ businesses on the prevalence of child labour, of forced labour, 
or “of unsafe and unhealthy working conditions or activities severely damaging the 
environment”.
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5. Perception of the “social” in microﬁnance by the MIVs and Investors 
During the workshop, the meaning of the term “social” for MIVs was discussed, 
resulting in the following:
MIVs / investment advisers Investors/funders
Social is:
• Poverty outreach
• Poverty reduction
• Expanding access to ﬁnancial 
services
• New opportunities
• Social responsibility – client 
protection (i.e. socially-
appropriate ﬁnancial services)
• Gender (only 1!)
Social is:
• Dignity
• Social responsibility – to the 
environment
• Poverty reduction
• Better health, education
• Contributing to the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs)
Perceptions of MIV participants of ‘social’ are more speciﬁcally MF sector related, 
while for Funders the concept ‘social‘ is broader, related to the achievement of the 
MDGs and acting in a socially responsible manner.
6. Concerns of MIVs 
At this stage it was felt that there was a confusing array of social performance initiatives 
by different networks of practitioners: which social performance initiatives and tools 
are useful for what? The Workshop could present only a few in a summary fashion.
Though the opportunity to give feedback on indicators used or not-used is appreciated, 
it remains difﬁcult to see and agree on which indicators are really ‘key’, cost-effective, 
meaningful but practical, in line with the overall goal of building up a sustainable 
ﬁnancial infrastructure. How then to avoid it becoming more of an academic exercise 
of little use for Microﬁnance Investment Vehicles (MIVs) and Microﬁnance Institutions 
(MFIs)?
Currently, some large funds are under pressure to disburse, and this leads to minimising 
the reporting requirements. Insisting on SP requirements and reporting could weaken 
the MIVs position of the capital market.  
MF investors recommend their better-off clients to diversify their portfolios with 
limiting exposure to   microﬁnance investments up to 5% of the overall portfolio. It 
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was mentioned that the positive and uncritical perception of microﬁnance is risky when 
negative news about microﬁnance may occur in the international headlines.
Between 50 to 60 MFIs in South America, Africa and Asia have participated in the 
testing and development of the Cerise tool (SPI) and about 30 MFIs developed their 
SP management tool with backing from the Imp-Act initiative.  Even so, some concern 
was expressed that current frameworks and indicators may be too much supply and 
donor driven. There was a need to focus more on local management and ownership. 
Moreover, unreﬂective standardisation in social and ﬁnancial performance reporting 
may create biases against MFIs operating in African rural areas. Different benchmarks 
are therefore required.
7. What type of reporting and indicators to prioritise?
7.1. Double or triple line reporting ? 
Which system to promote: Double or Triple Bottom line reporting? Or should we see it 
as a process from mainly single (ﬁnancial) towards Double and eventually,Triple ? 
Microﬁnance investments are perceived as double bottom line investments and have 
created a new asset class. There is also the assumption that good ﬁnancial and social 
performance will converge. While investors aim at least at a double bottom line, most 
workshop participants felt that it is too early for going for a complete standardisation 
of social performance indicators. The triple bottom line is clearly important for small 
enterprises and ‘higher end’ microﬁnance, whereas its relevance for ‘lower end’ micro-
enterprises needs still to be explored. 
So far the investors/fund providers look primarily at stable ﬁnancial returns and less at 
social performance. The MIVs are selected according to the reputation of the promoters 
thereby focusing on long-term ﬁnancial performance and sound management. 
There are different investor classes and categories (such as foundations, churches, 
retail investors) so that there is not one single investment motivation. This complicates 
the selection of indicators. 
7.2. Which social indicators to prioritise?
If input data coming from MFIs are of poor quality (inaccurate, incomplete and diverse), 
aggregate data of MIVs are of no great value either. There is a need for adjustment of reporting 
requirements to improve quality of the MIVs database on the SP of MFI partners. 
Current indicators show a strong credit bias (number of people reached by credit) while 
from a social point of view access to savings and insurance are equally, or for some 
categories of poor clients, even more important.
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Importance of consumer protection (a new movement of ‘Fair Microﬁnance’ has started 
organizing itself, campaigning against indebtedness and high interest).  Do MFIs have 
the tools to check on negative effects for clients (e.g. debt trap)? 
The difﬁculty in reaching standard indicators was mentioned, with the example of 
standardised environmental indicators that have not yet evolved over the past twenty 
years.  There is no need to standardise hastily and it could be better to allow for 
experiment, reﬂection and slow building. It is noteworthy that ﬁnancial performance 
reporting in microﬁnance, after all, took 10 years to become accepted internationally.
8. Social Rating, an emerging practice 
Several rating agencies have added ‘social rating’ to their range of products, mostly 
organised as a complement to ﬁnancial rating19. Social rating is an independent 
assessment of a MFI’s social performance using a standardized rating scale. Over 
the past 3-5 years they have piloted and tested their methodologies and systems.  In 
general, social ratings have shown to be much more cost-effective than conventional 
impact studies. 
While some donor agencies in general are supportive of the social rating concept 
and practice, MIVs so far do not make use of it.  If they will do so in future, is not 
clear. MIVs and investors may need some more time to familiarize themselves with the 
concept and practice.     
9. Social performance indicators for the MIVs and social investors: a tentative 
selection 
9.1. MFI Social Indicators 
MIVs were asked to ﬁll in a questionnaire that shows indicators they currently cover and 
others, which they would be interested in covering (if it becomes feasible to do so) and 
which they would select for ‘core’ reporting in future.  The responses by eight MIVs can 
be summarised as follows; 
• Six social Indicators currently collected by most MIVs and Funds, and regarded 
as a ‘key’: 
- Number of active borrowers (and/or loan accounts),
- Number of loans disbursed 
19  For more information on rating agencies active in this ﬁeld, see www.seepnetwork.org , Social 
Performance progress Brief vol.1 no.4
‘Pushing the Frontier of Performance
Reporting of Microfinance’ 
pI20
e-MFP European Dialogue, N°01, 2008
- Average loan size
- % female active borrowers,
- % growth in borrowers, 
- effective interest rates (not always published)
• Five social Indicators which were  considered as ‘key’, but seldom available or 
reported
- % of clients below national poverty line 
- % of clients below 1$/day or 2$/day poverty line 
- change in poverty lines ( as deﬁned – national/international) 
- change in MFI clients possession of assets ( productive or consumer) 
- change in living conditions ( housing, access to health care , diet, nutrition-
vulnerability
There was a third category social Indicators MIVs were interested in (‘nice to 
have’) such as number of clients with savings accounts or making use of insurance 
services,  number of people employed in MFI supported businesses and MFIs acting 
‘socially responsible’ in such areas as staff treatment, ‘decent’ working conditions for 
employees of micro- and small enterprises, etc.... The list could be further extended, 
but participants expressed concern that systems should be kept as simple and easy to 
handle as possible.  Information on changes in level of poverty of clients and quality 
of livelihood were viewed as basic (‘core’) but at the same time doubts were expressed 
whether this type of information can be collected in a cost-effective way.  
There was some discussion around ‘average loan outstanding’, a very practical 
indicator, as the stock indicator can be derived from the balance sheet.  ‘Average loan 
amount at disbursement’ was admitted to be more adequate/meaningful (as requested 
by LuxFlag), but most MFIs do not have this data so that it would come at additional 
costs. However, KfW analysis suggests a high correlation between small average loan 
size and outreach to ‘low income’ people.
10. Workshop Conclusions
Double bottom line reporting will become standard, eventually triple bottom line 
The concept of social performance is spreading fast, and a common concept and 
tools have become indispensable. Nowadays, the practice of social performance 
monitoring by MFIs is also fast evolving, and will eventually lead to a double bottom-
line accountability as a standard a few years from now. A triple bottom line, including 
environmental standards, may also become the standard.
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Do not ignore the ‘dark sides’ of Micro Credit
There was general agreement that microﬁnance needs to be deliberated on more 
critically by not ignoring its ‘dark’ sides, especially of Micro Credit. Therefore, pragmatic 
and low cost SP assessment tools are required in order for MIVs to invest into MFIs 
with a potentially positive SP and to sanction MFIs with a negative SP. 
Social ratings will allow market segmentation 
It is probable that social ratings will become standard practice, since they are far less 
expensive than ‘classical’ social impact assessments.  By targeting a larger range of 
microﬁnance investors it will allow for market segmentation where investors will have a 
choice between the level of ﬁnancial and social returns. 
MIVs and MFIs will need to adjust their MIS 
MIVs and MFIs should work towards good practice in reporting. They need to adjust 
their MIS, build capacity and understanding. Standardisation of the diverse reporting 
requirements has become necessary. However, experiment and reﬂection are necessary 
to avoid ‘wrong’ short cuts. Social investors increasingly want to know where their 
money goes, and ask for social transparency. What is the type of information investors 
need most? At this stage, public and private investors are not clear enough on the type 
of (qualiﬁed) information they want and need on social performance, or they do not 
demand it. But from an ethical and market development side there is a professional 
imperative to do more. 
IFIs are in a better position to impose SP standards than private investors 
There are very different types of investors: hedge funds, institutional investors, IFIs, 
donors, private investors. It was emphasized that private investors cannot impose 
standards on the MFIs (i.e. they rather select who they like most), whereas IFIs 
can pressure MFIs to comply with ‘good practice’ SP standards with the promise of 
subsidised rates. Nevertheless, the need for assessing the SP of the MIVs was stressed 
and identifying a platform for this endeavour was stressed.
SME lending requires special indicators
The importance of small enterprises for income and employment generation and the 
need for SME lending was mentioned as another frontier. SME lending is also part 
of microﬁnance, but requires quite different social indicators compared to micro 
enterprises, such as environmental behaviour and social responsibility of microﬁnance 
clients as employer-entrepreneurs.
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11. Topical issues for international investors and fund managers
     Review by the author 
The thematic focus of the Bern Workshop was still very much on the Social Performance 
of MFIs, which are  located in the developing world, including Eastern Europe, and 
funded by social investors, based ‘in the North’.  It did not focus per se on Social 
Performance of the investors themselves. The Social Performance of a Social Investor 
is not restricted to the aggregate of the social achievements of the MFIs it has ﬁnanced. 
There are other dimensions which count, proper to the investing institution, and which 
could not be given much attention in the discussions so far held, such as: 
• A deliberate policy choice to support smaller, emerging MFIs by smaller 
amounts.20
• Attention and weight given to social orientation and/or (expected) social 
performance of MFI in the selection and appraisal process (due diligence).
• Weight given to the ‘social risk’, i.e. the risk that intended social objectives will not 
be reached, or for negative side-effects to occur. 
• Terms of lending (hard currency or local currency).
• Selection of geographical areas (Africa often harder than other continents).
• Facilitating development of local capital markets (interbank lending, guarantees) 
versus creating dependence on international lending. 
• Participation in the international exchange and debate on social issues and MF 
through   documentation/publications/presentations.
• Type of ﬁnancing. Equity funding is more risky but from a social point of view 
more relevant (by the opportunity it creates for the MFI to offer savings products to 
clients and the greater likelihood of continuity of service by a more solid ﬁnancial 
structure).
• For ‘funds of funds’: the social orientation of ‘investment partners’ ( which act 
as co-ﬁnancier, or as an intermediary between MIV and MFI), and the social 
transparency of their policies and practice.
There might be other dimensions. The above tentative enumeration aims to demonstrate 
that while great progress has been made over the past years in developing an appropriate 
format for MFIs, a comprehensive framework to assess Social Performance at the 
investors’ level and that is widely accepted by the MF community, is still missing.
20 CGAP distinguishes  smaller, mid-size and larger MFIs according to portfolio size.
 Large: Latin America = > $15 million;Other Regions= > 8million 
 Medium: Latin America>4million<15 million;Other Regions >$2 million<$8million
 Small: Latin America<4million; Other Regions < $2 million
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Private investors are entering the MF capital market in great numbers, some as ‘retail 
investors’ with small amounts, others more afﬂuent, sometimes guided by special 
advisors, with bigger amounts. The latter regard MF investments as a special asset 
class of socially responsible investment, most of them expecting a moderate ﬁnancial 
return but also a ‘social return’ that can be demonstrated.21
Logically, social investors want to be assured that their investment will be socially 
performing. However, to the writer’s knowledge, the ﬁrst social auditing and rating of a 
MIV or Fund is still to be done. The combined ﬁnancial and social rating of MIVs and 
the funds they administer can be regarded as a new ﬁeld of activity Rating Agencies 
may wish to explore.22  This will lead to more informed choices for investors, especially 
for those who want to give some weight to expected social return in investment 
decisions.
In the workshop there was some discussion around the motives of social private 
investors versus public investors, and possible public private partnerships (PPP). 
Public investors with easy access to cheap money may crowd out private investors. 
However, in a growing market it would appear not to happen too often; yet, a sharper 
deﬁnition of the role of each category of funders depending on stage of development 
of markets and MFIs, seems desirable.
Workshop participants also asked for room for experimentation prior to the 
standardization of indicators and rating scales. Time is needed. It took 10 years, say 
the Workshop Conclusions, to come to that stage for the measurement of ﬁnancial 
performance and reporting to the MIX by the larger MFIs.  But is it wise to endorse 
a 10 years time frame?  Social return - depending on Social Performance of MFIs 
and indirectly of MIVs - is the « raison d’être » of most funds. In the period between 
the Bern Workshop and the preparation of this publication we have seen a growing 
number of publications and animated discussions on international MF ‘list serves’ 
critical of MicroFinance. MFIs, MIVs and Funds would be less vulnerable if they had 
the right instruments and data, externally audited, to illustrate that their social concern 
and return is not just based on widely proclaimed success stories, but has also been 
veriﬁed objectively on the basis of internationally agreed, transparent, criteria23.
21 Typically ‘retail investor’ funds are the Triodos Fair Share Fund, and the funds associated to the 
Oikocredit network. Big private investors often work through foundations. 
22 As is already currently the case for most Social Ratings, done by the established rating agencies 
targeting MFIs.
23 This was badly missing in the recent Compartamos debate. It was not clear how much harm or good 
had been done to borrowers, most of them women, paying an effective rate of interest of almost 
100%.
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There is still a long way to go for social performance management, measurement, 
reporting, auditing and rating to become accepted as standard practice by all players 
of the MF ‘Industry’. However, for Microﬁnance to fulﬁl its promise and potential in the 
ﬁght against poverty, it is necessary to go that path even if many obstacles are still to 
be overcome.
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Indicators Survey
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Améliorer le contrôle interne
Summary of 25 page report of the Social Investors 
subcommittee of the Social Performance Task Force
The survey and the survey sample
During the spring of 2007, The Social Investors Subcommittee of the Social Performance 
Task Force surveyed Social Investors regarding their opinion on social performance 
indicators.  A question list was send to 94 social investors of which 4524 responded, 
being a response rate of 47,9%, which indicates to some extent the importance social 
investors give to social performance issues. 
For interviews in Europe a small subgroup of the Social performance workgroup of 
eMFP participated in collecting the responses of European Social Investors. 
The respondents often had social ambitions formulated in their missions and were 
composed of 44% from Europe, against 37% from USA and 20% investors in 
developing countries themselves.  60% of the respondents classiﬁed themselves as 
offering capital near commercial rates, 27% at commercial rates and 13% charges 
below market rates.
A surprisingly high 47% reports annually on social performance results such as on 
poverty outreach or employment creation by MFI supported businesses. 
24 Alterﬁn, Calvert, Catalyst Microﬁnance investors, Citigroup Microﬁnance Group, Cordaid, 
Corporacion Andina de Fomento, Cresud, DOEN , Emergency Liquidity Facility, European Fund 
for Southeast-Europe, Finca, Finnfund, FMO, Global Bridge Fund, Global Microﬁnance Group 
SA, Global Partnerships Microﬁnance Funds, Gray Ghost, Growth Guarantee Fund, Investisseur 
et Partenaire pour le Developpement, KfW, ,Kiva, Locfund, Lok Capital, MFLO,  Microcredit 
Enterprises, Microcred, Microcredit Fund, Microvest Capital Management, MLC frontiers, 
Multilateral Investment Fund, Nicaragua Credit Alternative Fund, Partners for common Good, 
Rabobank, Responsibility, Shore Cap International, SIDI, The Dignity Fund, Triodos, Triple Jump, 
Unitus, Unitus Equity Fund, Unitus Equity Fund L.P.
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The survey ﬁndings 
A list of 45 possible social indicators was presented to the social investors with 
the question if they use the indicator already and if they are interested in using the 
given indicator.  The indicators were classiﬁed in 5 sub-groups: MFI-services, social 
responsibility, outreach, change over time and wider changes. On top of that, a list 
of indicators was given for appraisal on the way MFIs implement social performance 
management within their structure.   
The ﬁndings of the study are: 
MFI services or breadth of outreach 
Most used indicators are: the number of borrowers, growth of the number of borrowers 
and the average credit size. 
Less used is the outreach to savers or insurance takers. Less interest is observed in 
measuring the ﬁrst loan average size or in comparing the average loan to the GDP per 
capita which would make international comparison easier. 
Although actually less measured, social investors showed a high interest in measuring 
more outreach to insurance services. 
Social responsibility to clients
About 80% of social investors collect information on the effective interest rate, 
considering if the charges to clients are reasonable. 
Outreach characteristics
More than three quarters of social investors collect information on the number of 
women reached and more than half of them collect information on rural outreach. 
The creation of employment in supported enterprises, the number of those living under 
the poverty line is less measured, but there is an enormous interest in measuring the 
number of clients living under the poverty line. We can therefore conclude that for 
this issue the problem was to measure it. New techniques such as the Progress out of 
Poverty index might create a solution for this in the future. 
Appropriate service indicators
More than 75% measures portfolio at risk and write off ratios and even over 50% asks 
for information on client turn over, although more clarity in measurement concepts for 
this are needed. 
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Impact change over time of client’s indicators or employment creation indicators
Few investors collect information on change in poverty, asset level, housing conditions, 
education of client’s children, etc, as few MFIs have this data in their database, but 
over 60% of the social investors are interested in considering this data when it exists.
Indicators on social performance management within MFIs
The questions were asked in a way that the social investors could pronounce their opinion 
as something an MFI ‘’must have’’ or rather something that’s ‘’nice’’ when an MFI has 
it.  If we concentrate on what social investors say MFIs must have, 60% said a social 
mission with references to outreach to the poor and the systems to implement it.  
Still 30% indicated an ethical code, a decent work environment within the MFI and 
measuring staff retention as a ‘must have’. 
Issues such as measuring poverty level of clients at entry or over time, linking ﬁnancial 
to non-ﬁnancial services, a gender awareness policy, female representation among 
staff, management and board members and a systematic review of staff satisfaction 
were indicated as less needed. 
Overall ﬁndings on triple bottom line measuring
82% of social investors are interested in looking at results on social performance, 
more especially to evaluate effects on poverty reduction or employment creation, while 
less than 7% values the fact of client ownership or client representation within the 
structures of an MFI. 
62% of the respondents are also interested in environmental performance, the so 
called triple bottom line. 
In the indicators used, there is a clear preference for easily measurable and available 
indicators, which is for instance illustrated by the main practice of also interpreting 
ﬁnancial indicators from a social perspective.  Quite easy adaptations to make indicators 
better interpretable, such as dividing the average loan size by GDP per capita or 
correcting the charged interest rate for inﬂation to obtain the real cost charged to the 
clients are hardly ever done. This shows clearly the demand for very easy measures to 
use in a quick way.  As such, the huge interest in information on outreach to poverty, 
impact at client level, employment creation and environmental impact is probably not 
translated into practice because of the lack of easy monitoring solutions.  The interest 
for internal organizational issues such as client participation or how to deal with human 
resources came out as of less interest for social investors. 
Summary of Social Performance Indicators Survey
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ANNEX 1: Detailed results of the survey on social performance indicators with social 
investors.
MFI-services – breadth of outreach:
Investor Type Type A Investors Type B Investors Type C Investors Total
Number of active 
borrowers
80.0 20.0 0.0 38.9 55.6 5.7 42.9 57.1 0.0 46.7 44.4 2.2
Number of loans 
disbursed
16.7 33.3 16.7 44.4 33.3 11.1 33.3 58.3 0.0 37.8 40.0 8.9
Number of voluntary 
depositors
16.7 50.0 16.7 22.2 33.3 22.2 41.7 25.0 33.3 26.7 33.3 24.4
Percentage growth in 
active borrowers
16.7 50.0 0.0 44.4 37.0 11.1 50.0 41.7 8.3 42.2 40.0 8.9
Percentage growth in 
voluntary depositors
33.3 16.7 16.7 18.5 37.0 22.2 25.0 41.7 33.3 22.2 35.6 24.4
Number of clients with 
loan, life, and health 
insurance
0.0 0.0 83.3 14.8 7.4 48.1 33.3 8.3 58.3 17.8 6.7 55.6
Average loan size 16.7 66.7 0.0 51.9 40.7 0.0 50.0 50.0 0.0 46.7 46.7 0.0
Average loan size /  GNI 
per capita
0.0 16.7 66.7 29.6 33.3 22.2 33.3 33.3 25.0 26.7 31.1 28.9
Average ﬁrst loan size 33.3 33.3 16.7 33.3 7.4 29.6 16.7 16.7 50.0 28.9 13.3 33.3
Social responsibility to clients:
Investor Type Type A Investors Type B Investors Type C Investors Total
Effective interest rate 16.7 66.7 0.0 22.2 51.9 18.5 25.0 66.7 0.0 22.2 57.8 11.1
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Outreach:
Investor Type Type A Investors Type B Investors Type C Investors Total
Percentage rural 
clients
16.7 50.0 16.7 40.7 22.2 14.8 25.0 33.3 33.3 33.3 28.9 20.0
Percentage clients in 
remote rural areas or 
less developed regions
0.0 16.7 66.7 22.2 3.7 37.0 8.3 16.7 66.7 15.6 8.9 48.9
Percentage female 
clients 
0.0 66.7 16.7 33.3 44.4 3.7 50.0 33.3 8.3 33.3 44.4 6.7
Number employed 
in MFI supported 
businesses
0.0 50.0 33.3 14.8 0.0 44.4 25.0 16.7 50.0 15.6 11.1 44.4
Percentage clients 
below national poverty 
line at entry
0.0 33.3 50.0 14.8 0.0 59.3 8.3 16.7 50.0 11.1 8.9 55.6
Percentage clients 
below $1 or $2 per day 
at entry
0.0 33.3 50.0 7.4 0.0 59.3 8.3 8.3 58.3 6.7 6.7 57.8
Percentage clients 
from marginal or 
disadvantaged 
communities
0.0 16.7 66.7 7.4 3.7 51.9 8.3 58.3 66.7 4.4 6.7 66.7
Appropriate service indicators:
Investor Type Type A Investors Type B Investors Type C Investors Total
Client turnover 50.0 16.7 66.7 18.5 33.3 22.2 16.7 33.3 41.7 15.6 35.6 26.7
Portfolio at risk 16.7 66.7 0.0 37.0 55.6 0.0 33.3 58.3 0.0 33.3 57.8 0.0
Write-off ratio 33.3 33.3 16.7 37.0 55.6 0.0 33.3 50.0 8.3 35.6 51.1 4.4
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Impact Change indicators:
Investor Type Type A Investors Type B Investors Type C Investors Total
Change in poverty level 0.0 0.0 66.7 7.4 0.0 63.0 0.0 8.3 75.0 4.4 2.2 66.7
Change in assets 16.7 33.3 16.7 14.8 0.0 55.6 16.7 16.7 50.0 15.6 8.9 48.9
Change in living 
conditions
16.7 0.0 50.0 3.7 0.0 63.0 0.0 8.3 66.7 4.4 2.2 62.2
Ability to send 
daughters to primary/
secondary school
16.7 0.0 50.0 3.7 0.0 55.6 0.0 0.0 75.0 4.4 0.0 60.0
Ability to send sons 
to primary/secondary 
school
16.7 0.0 50.0 3.7 0.0 55.6 0.0 0.0 75.0 4.4 0.0 60.0
Investor Type Type A Investors Type B Investors Type C Investors Total
New hired non-family 
employment in 
microﬁnance supported 
businesses
0.0 0.0 66.7 0.0 0.0 59.3 8.3 0.0 66.7 2.2 0.0 60.0
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Social performance management within MFIs:
Investor Type Type A 
Investors
Type B 
Investors
Type C 
Investors
Total
Has a vision/mission that references outreach to the poor 
with systems to implement
0.0 66.7 14.8 59.3 33.3 58.3 17.8 60.0
Measures the poverty levels of clients at entry 33.3 33.3 59.3 11.1 83.3 0.0 62.2 11.1
Measures the poverty levels of clients over time 50.0 16.7 63.0 7.4 83.3 16.7 66.7 6.7
Has a code of ethics with effective systems in place to 
implement
33.3 16.7 44.4 37.0 58.3 33.3 46.7 33.3
Funds enterprises with “decent” working conditions 16.7 33.3 48.1 33.3 50.0 33.3 44.4 33.3
Offers or links to non-ﬁnancial services 50.0 0.0 55.6 14.8 75.0 0.0 60.0 8.9
Has a gender awareness policy 33.3 16.7 51.9 18.5 66.7 0.0 53.3 13.3
Tracks loans/trend information separately for men and 
women
16.7 50.0 33.3 33.3 83.3 0.0 44.4 26.7
Has a certain proportion of female representation on 
board, management, and ﬁeld staff
33.3 16.7 44.4 25.9 66.7 8.3 48.9 20.0
Has a vision/mission that references adaptation of 
services to client needs with effective systems to 
implement
33.3 16.7 44.4 40.7 50.0 41.7 44.4 37.8
Has conducted systematic review of staff satisfaction in 
the last year
33.3 16.7 63.0 3.7 50.0 16.7 55.6 8.9
Measures staff retention rate 16.7 33.3 51.9 29.6 50.0 33.3 46.7 31.1
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Alterﬁn
Date of creation: 1995
Status: cooperative society
Portfolio invested (31/12/2007): EUR 15.059.873 (USD 22.180.934)
Number of countries: 16
Number of MFIs: 40
Other type of organisations supported: producers associations related to fair trade (19)
Type of ﬁnancial instruments: credit, guarantee, participation
Source of funding: capital cooperative society (51%) and third party funds (49%)
Website: www.alterﬁn.be
1. Introduction
Alterﬁn is a Belgian co-operative society (1995) set up by NGO’s and banks to contribute 
to the development of local ﬁnancial institutions in the South that are oriented towards 
opportunity-poor or oppressed groups in society. Since its inception more than 1,000 
private shareholders have joined the co-operative.
Alterﬁn is a social investor, which means it has a mix of ﬁnancial and social objectives. 
Therefore its investments have to comply with a set of ﬁnancial and social criteria. 
There is little discussion on ﬁnancial objectives. There are generally accepted tools and 
standardised indicators to measure ﬁnancial performance and even benchmarks that 
help to set the ﬁnancial criteria.
However, the situation is completely different for social objectives. There is a lot of 
discussion on social objectives, on tools to measure them and on criteria to assess 
them. This article describes the process Alterﬁn is following to manage its own social 
performance. 
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This article has no academic ambition. It draws in the ﬁrst place on Alterﬁn’s own 
experience, but we have learned a lot from important work that has been done by 
organisations such as: Imp-Act, the Social Performance Task Group25, CERISE, the 
SEEP network and others. Some of the concepts and part of the tools we are using 
have been developed by these organisations. In this article we will not always refer to 
these organisations as it is sometimes difﬁcult to know where an idea, a concept or 
a tool has originated, but we think these organisations have played and still play an 
essential role in keeping Social Performance on the agenda and in further developing 
concepts and tools.
2. The Start-up of Social Performance Management at Alterﬁn
At its inception Alterﬁn developed a credit and investment manual. An important chapter 
of this manual was dealing with the social objectives of Alterﬁn. It was mainly focusing 
on the type of organisations Alterﬁn wanted to work with, as this was an important 
element of our mission. When the credit committee discussed credit applications 
on the basis of the manual, often the committee ended up in very time-consuming 
discussions regarding the social aspects of an application and it was difﬁcult to have 
an efﬁcient decision-making process. In 2002 Alterﬁn decided to evaluate and to 
improve its credit-procedure. Regarding the social objectives, the evaluation came up 
with three conclusions: 
• Different levels in Alterﬁn must share a common social analysis model which 
should be made explicit 
• Alterﬁn needs measuring tools and indicators that can give sufﬁcient quantitative 
and qualitative data to feed the analysis model 
• Alterﬁn needs more explicit social criteria on the basis of which decisions can be 
taken.
So, by the end of 2002 Alterﬁn started an internal deliberation process involving team, 
credit committee and board-members. We were lucky that in the same period CERISE 
started its Social Performance Indicators (SPI) Initiative26. Our own reﬂection process 
beneﬁted a lot from the work that was done by the SPI Initiative. In the ﬁrst place it 
was important to understand the impacting chain from the micro-ﬁnance institution 
(MFI) level up to the client level. As an investor we are interested to know what the 
social performance of the MFI is. 
25 Promoted by CGAP, Ford Foundation and Argidius Foundation.
26  All documents on this initiative are available on www.cerise-microﬁnance.org
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3. The Social Analysis Model
Social performance of an MFI is deﬁned as its capability to impact positively on the 
live’s of people (its clients). This capability is to a great degree determined by the 
organisation’s policies, procedures and processes (we will come to that later). 
Whether social performance will eventually lead to a positive social impact on the 
lives of clients will further depend on the environmental conditions and on the clients’ 
capabilities. Graphically this social analysis model can be depicted as follows:
Before we explore further the organisational dimensions of the MFI’s social performance, 
we want to dwell on the environmental conditions and the clients capabilities that 
will determine the ﬁnal impact. The environmental conditions relate to the economic, 
political, socio-cultural and ecological conditions in which the client is living and 
operating. These environmental conditions can be more or less conducive to the use of 
the MFI’s services by the client.
Political
Economically – Financial
Ecological
Structure & segmentation
Competition & consolidation 
Legal framework
Though the MFI can barely inﬂuence these conditions, it is important to take these 
conditions into account. Alterﬁn as an investor will not work in countries or regions 
where conditions make it almost impossible for a client to make good use of MFI’s 
services. At the same time, these conditions might impede the MFI from working 
effectively and efﬁciently. 
Social Performance Management at Alterfin
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At the MFI level it is important to see how it interacts with this environment. Therefore 
we will assess how the MFI relates to other organisations such as: micro-ﬁnance 
networks, local and central authorities, farmers’ associations etc.
The client’s capabilities to make good use of the MFI services, are to a large extent 
determined by her/his resource capital, social capital and technical and entrepreneurial 
capacities.
Land property
Title deeds
Client - client
Client – authorities
Client – markets
Educational level
Resource capital of clients
The social and political 
capital of clients
Technical and 
entrepreneurial 
capacities
The resource capital refers to the (land) property, infrastructure and equipment that 
the client has as a starting base for running his/her economic activities. The social 
capital refers to how the client is connected with other clients, with the markets and 
with authorities. Finally the clients’ capability to make optimal use of the MFI services 
is determined by her/his technical and entrepreneurial capacity.
For the social investor the clients’ capabilities remain a black spot. However they will 
determine to a large extent how the client can make good use of the MFI’s services.
The only thing we can assess is to what extent the MFI is conscious of the importance 
of the clients’ capabilities. Does the MFI take into account the resource capital of the 
client? Does the MFI value how the client interacts with other clients, with the market, 
with local authorities? Has the MFI certain minimum requirements with respect to 
technical and entrepreneurial capacities of the client? Does it organise or facilitate 
training for the clients? These questions form part of the “organisational dimensions” 
of the MFI that will determine its social performance. In a schematic way it can be 
depicted as follows:
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The analysis of the MFI on 
poverty 
Stated mission
Geographical & socio-economic 
targeting
Outreach (breadth, depth …)
Genesis of the MFI
Alliances with other local 
structures
Composition of organisational 
bodies
The position of the clients 
within the organisation
Transparency
Targeting and outreach of 
the organisation
Local embedding and 
social responsibility of the 
organisation
The two main organisational dimensions we take into consideration are 1) targeting and 
outreach and 2) local embedding and social responsibility. The categorisation of these 
dimensions is not watertight, but they were a kind of compromise between what we 
learned from other initiatives, our internal discussions and experience.
For both dimensions we make a distinction between intent (what MFI’s want to achieve) 
and results (what they actually achieved). Both dimensions can be broken down into 
different composing elements. We are interested to know what the MFI’s own analysis 
of poverty is and how this appears in their mission and their targeting. Data on different 
aspects of their outreach will indicate how far reality is from their intentions. Further 
we consider it important how the MFI sees itself in the larger environment and how 
it connects to this. Often the genesis of the MFI already gives a good indication of 
how the MFI is embedded in the local society. Through its alliances, through the 
composition of its shareholders and board of directors, the MFI can further strengthen 
or weaken its local embedding. The same applies to the position of the clients within 
Social Performance Management at Alterfin
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the MFI. Finally, transparency is also an important factor with respect to its social 
responsibility. Not only in the sense of disclosing ﬁnancial ﬁgures, but also with respect 
to its procedures, decision taking process, ways of calculating interest etc.
4. Social Performance Measuring Tools
To have a Social Analysis Model is the ﬁrst step. The second is to develop and use the 
necessary tools to generate data that can be fed into the model. As an investor we cannot 
but adapt a pragmatic approach to this assignment. This means that we have to keep 
in mind what the purpose of these data is, how we can process them and at what cost. 
The purpose is threefold: to assess, to monitor and to evaluate the social performance 
of the MFI’s. The assessment must facilitate the funding decision. As it is part of the 
“due diligence” process it can contain more qualitative data. These are collected on 
the basis of a questionnaire (see annex 1). The questionnaire Alterﬁn is using is largely 
based on the questionnaire that was developed by Cerise during their SPI exercise. It 
is questioning the “organisational dimensions” of social performance, mainly linked to 
targeting (outreach), local embedding and social responsibility. The difference with the 
Cerise approach is that up until now we have left the questions open. We give neither 
weights nor (ordinal) scores to different answers. This reduces the practicality of the 
questionnaire with respect to benchmarking, graphical representation and comparison 
with criteria. On the other hand, it gives more room for qualitative analysis and inclusion 
of contextual matters.
The social performance report that is based on this questionnaire is used in the 
decision taking process (mainly at credit committee level). However this questionnaire 
and report is not appropriate for further monitoring of the MFI’s social performance as 
it is too complex and too qualitative. That is why a “Social Performance Management 
(SPM) - Data Sheet” was developed (see annex 2). This sheet contains three categories 
of questions: policy, process and outreach. The choice of the different questions is also 
based on the social analysis model, but most of the questions give data on cardinal 
or binary scale which are easier to process and to aggregate. The data that we obtain 
through this sheet are indeed used to build a data base that is used to get a global 
picture of Alterﬁn’s social performance.
The variables of the SPM Data Sheet are comparable to those of the recent social 
rating experiments. We think however, that social rating is a very difﬁcult exercise. 
Rating assumes that you have optimal standards, benchmarks. To understand social 
performance you need to contextualise the data you have. It is only within this context 
that you can make statements about the social performance. 
The social performance assessment questionnaire and the Social Performance 
Management data sheet are two measuring tools that are used in a systematic way. The 
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two tools provide us information on the social performance of the MFI’s and as such, 
this information is vital for Alterﬁn’s own social performance management. However, 
we are also strongly interested in impact studies. This type of information is necessary 
for two reasons. Impact studies provide us with the necessary information in order to 
adapt our social analysis model and secondly, impact studies are the only empirical 
basis for our social criteria. Alterﬁn is not initiating (nor funding) impact-studies at MFI 
level so we are dependent on other initiatives to get impact-data. 
5. Social Criteria
The most difﬁcult assignment was and still is, to arrive at explicit social criteria. As we 
already mentioned regarding social rating, it is very difﬁcult to deﬁne general applicable 
optimal standards. That’s why it is also difﬁcult to come to explicit social criteria. It is 
probably only possible to work with contextualised or conditional criteria. In that sense 
we are trying to contextualise certain data: for instance as follows:
• How do the credit modalities compare to other MFI’s in the region: minimum 
amount, interest-rate, guarantees, duration …
• How does the amount of the average credit27 compare to the level of local 
development as it is expressed by the GNI per capita28. 
Sometimes our policy explicitly favours certain criteria in a contextualised way; for 
instance as follows:
• In a rural African context member based organisations are important.
• A group approach is important when targeting the very poor and where building 
social capital is needed.
• In a rural context (but not only then) it is important to be locally well embedded and 
to have good connections with other organisations in order to provide necessary 
complementary services (training, marketing …).
The (contextualised) social criteria are not static and might change overtime. They are 
inﬂuenced by new insights, our own experience and of course the changing context.
As social criteria change in space (context) and time, the decision taking process with 
respect to social performance needs necessarily to be dynamic. As social criteria are 
much less clear-cut than for instance ﬁnancial criteria, they leave room for interpretation 
and discussion. This again hampers the efﬁciency of the decision making process.
Social Performance Management at Alterfin
27 Actually it is better to use the average amount of the ﬁrst credit a client takes, but this information 
is not always available.
28 Even this criterion is not always appropriate as there are a lot of differences between regions in the 
same country.
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6. Conclusion
Alterﬁn has made some important progress in its Social Performance Management, 
by formulating a social analysis model, by creating social performance measuring 
tools and by trying to set social criteria. In this way, Alterﬁn has improved its own 
social performance management and the decision making process. However, we 
cannot consider it as a job done. First, because as we explained social performance 
management is a dynamic process and as such needs constant adaptation. Secondly, 
social performance management has to be socialised internally and externally. Internally 
all levels of the organisation need to have proper understanding of the different elements 
of our social performance management. Externally our partners need to understand our 
social performance approach and need to agree to provide the necessary data for our 
social performance measuring tools. This is not an easy task. Our partner MFI’s have 
their own dynamics with respect to social performance management and Alterﬁn is 
not the only investor they have to respond to with respect to (social) performance 
information. That is why it is important to come up with approaches and tools that 
are more generally accepted (as is the case with ﬁnancial performance). The different 
platforms and networks have still a role to play here and we hope this article might 
contribute to it.
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ANNEX 1: Alterﬁn - Social Performance Assessment Questionnaire
Dimension 1: Target group and outreach of the activities towards poor and excluded 
persons 
1.a. What is the mission of the MFI  1.b. Does the MFI respond to poverty or inequality problems?
1.c. Who is the target group (geographically and socio-economically)?  1.d. Is there a gender policy?
1.e. Description of the savings products (amount – interest rate – term)
1.f. Description of the credit products‘ characteristics (amount – interest rate – term – guarantees)
1.g. Description of other products (other than savings or credits: transactions, “Western Union”, 
training, …)  
Dimension 2: Improvement of the social capital and policy towards the target group 
(clients andmembers)  
2.a. Are the clients/members involved in the administration/direction of the MFI? In what way?  
2.b. Do the clients/members receive training? What sort of training?  
2.c. What autonomy do the groups (groups of clients for credits) dispose of?  
2.d. Do the groups have other community/social functions?   
Dimension 3: Local and international integration and social responsibility of the MFI 
Local and international integration 
3.a. When was the MFI created? Who founded the MFI? Why was the MFI created?  
3.b. Do/did the founders of the MFI have links with the local community-other initiatives?  
3.c. Do the members of the board/directors have links with the local community?  
3.d. What main alliances does the MFI have with local, national or international organisations (ﬁnancial 
and non ﬁnancial, governmental and non governmental)?  
3. f. How is the MFI governed and controlled (internal and external audit – BOD – General 
Assembly)?  
3.g. Is there transparency regarding the direction towards the clients/members?  
3.h. Is there transparency regarding the ﬁnancial situation towards the clients/members?  
3.i. Is there transparency concerning the cost of credit towards the clients/members?  
Social responsibility (internal)  
3.j. How are the salaries of the credit ofﬁcers of the MFI situated compared to those of teachers of 
the primary school?
3.k. What is the salary bracket in the organisation? (management, credit ofﬁcers, administrativepersonnel, 
logistic personnel)  Social responsibility (external)
3.l. In what way are the activities of the MFI adapted to the local culture (language, values…)?  
3.m. Has the credit program of the MFI effects (positive – negative) on the local social cohesion? 
Environmental (ecologic) responsibility
3.n Has the MFI an environmental policy?(internal guidelines, external guidelines, exclusion list, …)
Social Performance Management at Alterfin
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ANNEX 2. Social Performance Management Data Sheet
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The Experience of INCOFIN
I. The context
Microﬁnance institutions (MFIs) basically differ from conventional ﬁnancial institutions 
in their social mission and commitment, which are often at the very heart of the vision 
of these institutions. There are, however, only a very limited number of IMFs that can 
actually boast a solid record of social performance and efﬁciency.
Social performance measurement is still in the initial stage of its development, and 
has only just reached the level of research that is necessary for its consolidation in 
the ﬁeld; in fact, many operators are currently experimenting with social performance 
measurement tools30. Moreover, certain initiatives seek to encourage operators to agree 
on the use of common indicators in measuring the social performance of MFIs31. The 
present article ﬁts into this context and presents the particular experience of Incoﬁn, 
a player-investor in the area of social performance.   
A Belgian cooperative company founded in 1992, Incoﬁn32 manages 4 microﬁnance 
investment funds with a global geographical coverage. In December 2007, Incoﬁn 
managed an investment portfolio of nearly 65 million euros, spread across 18 countries 
29 David Dewez is Investment Manager at Incoﬁn. The author wishes to thank Nicolas Blondeau, 
Patrick d’Huart and Geert Peetermans of the Incoﬁn team for their comments and contributions. 
30 Cf. Lapenu et al. (2004)
31 Two examples are the efforts of the Task Force in the area of social performance and the conference 
on social reporting by investment funds, organized by the Swiss cooperation (SECO) in 2007. 
32 More information about Incoﬁn can be found at www.incoﬁn.be
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and 49 MFIs. Today, Incoﬁn positions itself as Belgium’s leading microﬁnance 
investment  company.
Incoﬁn’s mission is “to support MFIs by providing ﬁnancial services tailored to the 
needs of micro-entrepreneurs, thereby enabling them to improve their living conditions 
and to break the vicious circle of poverty”. Incoﬁn’s intrinsic values include social 
motivation, transparency, operational efﬁciency and long-term vision.
Consistent with its mission, Incoﬁn has from the outset focused on the social 
performance of MFIs as a key criterion in the evaluation of their overall performance. 
Incoﬁn’s experience in the ﬁeld of social performance of the MFIs mainly comes to the 
fore in the following four stages: 
1. Selection of candidate MFIs for investment by Incoﬁn.
2. Determination of the investment conditions by Incoﬁn.
3. Monitoring of the overall performance of the institutions in which the company 
has invested. 
4. Reporting on the social performance of its investments (annual report and other 
reports)
This article will ﬁrst present the Incoﬁn approach and methodology, and then discuss 
a number of recently obtained results. The article concludes with a few general 
recommendations for operators in the sector and microﬁnance investors in particular.
II. Evaluation of the social performance of MFIs in the selection of candidate 
institutions
As soon as they visit the candidate institution, the investment ofﬁcers incorporate its 
social performance into their analysis. This aspect is an integral part of the evaluation 
of the overall performance, which is reﬂected in two performance scores: one for 
ﬁnancial and managerial performance, and another for social performance. These 
scores are then presented to and evaluated within the investment committee.
Assessment of the social performance is performed with a tool that Incoﬁn has been 
using since the start of its operations. Developed in-house, this measurement tool is 
inspired both by the reference tools used in the trade33 and by the experience of the 
Incoﬁn team. 
33 They include, for example, the tools developed by CERISE or ACCION which served as sources of 
inspiration for the tool designed by Incoﬁn. 
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It should be noted that the tool has been considerably reﬁned. Originally a relatively 
simple tool built around only a few indicators, today it is a more complex (and more 
accurate) instrument that incorporates 36 indicators across 5 dimensions of social 
performance. 
The ﬁrst evaluation tool devised by Incoﬁn included 6 indicators, which are deﬁned 
below. These indicators were not broken down into dimensions, but together constituted 
a simple checklist that the investment ofﬁcer had to take into account during the 
analysis. 
1. Does the MFI operate in difﬁcult segments34?
2. The depth of outreach of the MFI (measured by the average loan/GDP ratio)
3. The outreach in terms of number of clients
4. Existence of a system for monitoring the social performance of the institution
5. Suitability of products and continuous innovation
6. Quality of client service
Based on these indicators, Incoﬁn assigned a social performance score from A (for 
MFIs with high performance) to D (for MFIs with inadequate performance). The score 
was subsequently included in the report presented to the investment committee.
Aware of the limits of the tool, Incoﬁn thoroughly revised it in 2007, introducing 
more generic indicators and dimensions, commonly accepted in the sector, in a 
more structured manner. The current tool35 takes the following 5 dimensions into 
consideration:
1. Mission and Vision
2. Scale and outreach
3. Quality of client service
4. Human resources
5. Environment and social contribution to the community
Each dimension is measured by a series of quantitative and qualitative indicators, which 
the investment ofﬁcers examine during their performance analysis.  These parameters 
have the advantages that they are easy to measure, address the main aspects of social 
performance and are recognized by the sector. The tool does, however, present a 
The Role of Socially Responsible Investors in the 
Social Performance of Microfinance Institutions
34 Given the speciﬁcities of each country, it is a qualitative assessment of the market reached by the 
MFI, mainly based on geographic indicators (costly to reach, neglected by most of the MFIs).
35 The questionnaire developed by Incoﬁn is attached to this document.
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number of speciﬁc differences. For its inclusion in the procedures of an investment 
company, the tool must in fact, meet the following requirements:
• it must be easy to use
• the data must be easily collectible 
• the dimensions and indicators used in the assessment model must take into 
account a sufﬁciently large number of social performance indicators, and
• the indicators must, as much as possible, not be inﬂuenced by normative views or 
value judgments36.
Information is collected through consultations with employees of the institutions during 
the visits, through documentation (manuals, statistics) given by the institution, and 
indicators are computed by the team of Incoﬁn. Most of the information is veriﬁable and 
veriﬁed (cross-checked). To give an example, the existence and content of exclusion 
lists can be veriﬁed with the internal audit and knowledge of its existence by the loan 
ofﬁcers can then be analyzed. 
Based on these indicators, Incoﬁn elaborated a scoring system that is used to 
quantify the social performance of the MFIs under assessment. The ﬁrst stage in the 
development of this scoring system was to weight each of the 5 dimensions included 
in the model, as detailed below:
Dimensions Weight # indicators per examined dimension
Mission and Vision 10% 5
Scale and outreach 30% 11
Quality of service 25% 8
Human resources 25% 7
Environment and social 
contribution to the 
community
10% 5
Total 100% 36
36 While Incoﬁn is well aware of the fact that its tool also includes normative views, it has endeavoured 
to limit the number of indicators reﬂecting value judgments to an absolute minimum.
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The results obtained are classiﬁed into the following categories: 
• Score < 50%, IMF with inadequate social performance: ﬁle is rejected
• Score between 51% and 65%, IMF with poor social performance
• Score between 66% and 80%, IMF with good social performance
• Score between 81% and 90%, IMF with very good social performance
• 90%, IMF with excellent social performance
The use of 5 dimensions and the scope of certain indicators make it difﬁcult to 
obtain a high score (above 80%).  It is not only sufﬁcient to have a good mission, a 
good scale and a good outreach (i.e. serving clients with a low economic proﬁle or 
considered “poor”), but also to provide a good client service and to adopt an adequate 
human resource policy, something which is ignored by many MFIs. Certain erroneous 
pretexts or prejudices might in fact maintain that MFIs always lack resources, or that 
MFI clients do not need a client service that meets the same standards as that which 
is provided by conventional ﬁnancial institutions. Note that MFIs also have a direct 
role to play in their relation with the environment and the community in which they 
operate, hence the inclusion in the measurement tool of a dimension that focuses on 
the environment and the contribution to the community.
III. Some results of Incoﬁn’s experience
III.1 The important role to be played by investment companies
The implementation of this tool has enabled Incoﬁn to assess the social performance 
of the institutions in which it invests, yet without generating any major operational 
problems. It is difﬁcult to precisely estimate the time expenditure by the investment 
ofﬁcers, but the workload and the additional operational costs – for both Incoﬁn and 
the MFIs – appear to have been limited.  Based on this experience, it may therefore be 
concluded that investment companies can also directly contribute to the assessment 
of the social performance of MFIs without incurring additional costs.
The Role of Socially Responsible Investors in the 
Social Performance of Microfinance Institutions
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III.2 The social performance of Incoﬁn’s investment portfolio
For the 23 social performance analyses that it has carried out with the new tool since 
the beginning of 2007, Incoﬁn can report the following aggregated results:
DIMENSIONS AVERAGE SCORES OF THE 
INCOFIN PORTFOLIO
Mission and Vision 8,2/10 82%
Scale and outreach 24/30 80%
Customer service 17/25 68%
Human resources 21/25 84%
Environment and Contribution to 
the community
5,2/10 52%
AVERAGE TOTAL SCORE 74.2%
The average social performance score of the MFIs included in Incoﬁn’s portfolio is 
74.2%. This is considered a ‘good’ score, which nevertheless reveals certain gaps. 
The following graph shows the results for each analyzed dimension.
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It can be seen that the MFIs in Incoﬁn’s portfolio obtain higher scores in the dimensions 
“Scale and Outreach”, “Social Mission” and “Human Resources” and score only 
modestly in “Client Service” and receive an insufﬁcient score for “Protection of the 
environment and contribution to the community”.  It is generally assumed that the 
latter two dimensions are not yet sufﬁciently taken into account by MFIs in general.
How can this be explained?  As for customer service, many MFIs have left this issue 
“to be dealt with later”, believing their primary mission is to provide access to ﬁnancial 
services. Today, with the help of the competition, this simple criterion is no longer 
sufﬁcient. Moreover, practical experience shows that MFI clients also demand quality 
services37, just like clients of conventional ﬁnancial institutions. It should further 
be noted that Incoﬁn has integrated into the dimension of client service quality a 
component of transparency of the information that is provided to clients (e.g. the 
interest rate). Barring MFIs operating in markets that are regulated in this respect (e.g. 
Peru, Colombia and Bolivia), there is still only a very limited number of MFIs that have 
embraced full transparency.  
III.3 Incorporating social performance measurement into risk assessment: the exam-
ple of Incoﬁn
Investment companies are supposed to include the results of risk analyses and to use 
them in determining the investment conditions and modalities. The perception of the 
investment risk is thus positively correlated with the investment cost and conditions. 
The logic is rational: the riskier an investment is deemed to be, the higher its expected 
return will have to be for the investor. 
What to do, then, with the social performance score? Can it also enter into the overall 
assessment of the various risks to which the MFI is exposed? If yes, would it be 
possible to incorporate the social performance score in such a way that it intervenes in 
determining the investment conditions?
The experience of Incoﬁn proves that it should only be considered normal for the social 
performance score to be an integral part of the measurement of the MFI’s risks and 
therefore of the investment conditions. It is precisely this that distinguishes a ‘socially 
responsible’ investment company from one that is motivated only by ﬁnancial gain. 
A recent empirical analysis demonstrated that Incoﬁn uses both the ﬁnancial and the 
social performance score in the assessment of the risks, and therefore also in the 
determination of the investment conditions.
37 Cf. Brand and Gerschick (2000): Maximizing Efﬁciency: The Path to Enhanced Outreach and 
Sustainability.  
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38 The study by Natasha Wagner of Infocin’s investments shows that the coefﬁcient of correlation 
between the IRR and the combined score is 0.64% with a conﬁdence interval of 95%.
The following graph shows the correlation between the IRR (internal rate of return) 
and the overall performance score of the MFI38, combining its ﬁnancial and social 
performance. It can be seen that the higher the combined score, the lower the IRR. 
In other words, the better the MFI performs both ﬁnancially and socially, the lower the 
interest rate that will be required by Incoﬁn. There is no doubt that this constitutes 
a major incentive for MFIs to adopt measures aimed at improving their ﬁnancial and 
social performance.
It is important to say that Incoﬁn invests in MFIs who have achieved a minimum level 
of both social and ﬁnancial performance.  With this in mind, a MFI which was not 
performing on one of the two criteria would not be selected for the investment. 
III.4  Insights from measuring the social performance of MFIs 
Since it implemented the latest version of its social performance measurement tool 
in 2007 and up until January 2008, Incoﬁn evaluated the social performance of 
23 institutions, including 12 NGOs, 9 non-banking institutions and 2 banks. These 
observations are distributed across 3 continents (14 in Latin America, 5 in Africa, and 
4 in Eurasia).
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The results presented further on are based on the observations made from this sample 
of 23 MFIs and of course, the application of the Incoﬁn methodology. The sample size, 
although small, nevertheless allows a number of interesting trends to be identiﬁed:
• First, the result shows that providing traditionally excluded populations with access 
to ﬁnancial services and products is in itself not enough to obtain a good social 
performance score.  
• The legal construction of the institution does not appear to be directly correlated 
with its social performance. Therefore, it would seem incorrect to hold that one 
type of MFI performs better than another type from a social point of view. The 
empirical analysis carried out by Incoﬁn on the basis of the 23 observations made 
between June 2007 and January 2008 shows that among the 5 MFIs obtaining 
the highest social performance scores, there are 3 commercial MFIs and 2 non-
proﬁt organizations. However, it would be incorrect to conclude that commercial 
MFIs in general have a higher standard of social performance.
• The poor results of the MFIs at the bottom of the social performance ranking are 
due primarily to the lack of effort that they put into human resources and client 
service, both key factors in the success of MFIs (and making up 50% of the total 
result). 
• Generally speaking, MFIs perform poorly in environmental policies and in the area 
of contribution to the community. In spite of certain recent efforts39, a limited 
number of them have clear environmental policies, and of these, the majority 
conﬁne themselves exclusively to the use of lists of activities that they cannot 
ﬁnance. 
• Nearly all MFIs score high in the social mission and vision area. This once more 
demonstrates the different nature of their activities as compared to those of 
conventional ﬁnancial institutions.
IV. Conclusion
It is important to stress that the social performance evaluation which may be undertaken 
by investment companies can never replace the assessment that might be carried out 
by specialized institutions such as credit rating agencies and other research institutes. 
While the scope of the social performance measurement practised by a company like 
Incoﬁn is more limited, it does not make the exercise any less effective.
The Role of Socially Responsible Investors in the 
Social Performance of Microfinance Institutions
39 One example is the initiative of the FMO, of which Incoﬁn is a member. For more information see 
http://www.fmo.nl/en/publications/environmental_social_risk_management_tools_MFI.php
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The implication for Incoﬁn on the issue is not limited to the assessment of social 
performance for the due diligence, but goes much beyond. Some MFIs which were the 
subject of a social assessment have been interested by  Incoﬁn’s approach. Several 
MFIs in Latin America have asked for the use of this model for their own assessment 
of the social performance on an annual basis. This tool has also an objective in helping 
MFIs to identify risks when certain criteria are not adopted  which can lead, for example, 
to a high level of drop-outs among the clients, or to a high turn-over among staff.
Moreover, investments in capital by Incoﬁn are generally linked to an active participation 
in the Board of Directors of the MFIs. The Board represents the ideal body to strengthen 
social performance in parallel with the objectives of proﬁtability. As such, Incoﬁn 
supports the adoption of actions that can maintain the MFIs “double bottom-line”.
This article has in fact shown that, following the example of Incoﬁn, it is possible for 
investment companies to incorporate the measurement of the social performance of 
MFIs into the actual performance assessment. To this end, it is important to develop 
a tool which is both complete and pragmatic without costing much to the MFI and the 
investment fund.
The experience of Incoﬁn shows that it is also possible – or even desirable – for 
socially responsible investors to use the results of the social performance assessment 
in determining the investment conditions. Investors could thus easily encourage the 
MFIs to adopt policies aimed at improving their social performance and this is an 
essential prerequisite both to promote professionalization of the MFIs and to avoid 
over-emphasis on the  social dimension.
In conclusion, the case of Incoﬁn highlights the important role that investment 
companies have to play in promoting the measurement of the social performance of 
MFIs, together with other operators in the sector. Incoﬁn encourages the generalized 
adoption on the part of socially responsible investors of the measurement of the social 
performance of the MFIs in which they plan to invest. There are two fundamental 
reasons that motivate such a commitment: (i) on the one hand, the concern of “socially 
responsible” investors to ensure consistency between their acts and their mission, 
and (ii) on the other hand, the opportunity and the responsibility they have to directly 
contribute to promoting observance of the principle of the “triple bottom line” (ﬁnancial, 
social and environmental).
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Annex 1. The Incoﬁn social performance evaluation tool
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New Experiences in Oikocredit
1. Oikocredit in a nutshell
Oikocredit is an International Development Finance Institution established in 1975 
at the initiative of the World Council of Churches. Oikocredit’s mission is to promote 
global justice by challenging people, churches and others to share their resources 
through socially responsible investments and to empower people with credit. 
Registered as a Cooperative Society in the Netherlands, Oikocredit operates with 
investment capital from churches, private individuals and institutions from all over the 
world.  At the end of December 2007, investment capital from members exceeded  
318 million.  
Oikocredit’s core business is development ﬁnancing to SMEs, Fair Trade enterprises, 
Microﬁnance and community based enterprises in over 60 countries.   A network of 11 
Regional Ofﬁces and 29 country ofﬁces is involved in project identiﬁcation, evaluation, 
monitoring and administration.
Improving Social Performance 
Management
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Oikocredit’s presence globally*
* This unconventional upside down representation of the world is an illustration of how Oikocredit looks at the 
world. For a list of the countries of operation of Oikocredit, see Annexe page 64.
Financing options include medium to long term loans (in Euro, US Dollar or local 
currency), Credit Lines, Guarantees or Equity Investments. 
Oikocredit’s outstanding development portfolio amounted to  273 million as of 31 
December 2007.  The bulk (40%) was outstanding in Latin America.  Asia and Central 
& Eastern Europe accounted for another 41% and Africa for 17% of the outstanding 
portfolio.  Financing to Fair Trade Organizations in Western Europe and North America 
accounted for 1.4% of the total outstanding portfolio.
79% or  216 million of this outstanding portfolio is in the hands of 396 partner 
organizations involved in providing Financial Services.  These partners - cooperatives, 
non-bank ﬁnancial institutions, NGOs, banks - provide savings, credit, insurance 
and other ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial products and services to micro entrepreneurs, 
community based enterprises, small and medium enterprises through individual or 
collective methodologies.
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2. Oikocredit’s SPM Initiatives
The empowerment of the poor, the alleviation of poverty through job creation and 
income generation, the creation of a more just society – these are at the core of 
Oikocredit’s mission.  These social goals are embedded in Oikocredit’s project criteria. 
Oikocredit supports enterprises which:
• beneﬁt poor and disadvantaged people
• contribute to the social and economic advancement of the larger community in 
which it operates
• directly involve women especially in decision-making and in conceptualization, 
implementation and evaluation of operations
• respect ecological impact and the protection of animals and species
• promote improvement in general well-being, political empowerment and economic 
structures 
• possess appropriate management and technical leadership and which are 
technically and ﬁnancially viable.
In the past, Oikocredit reported on its social performance primarily through client 
stories and case studies.  Although these provided interesting insights into how 
individuals or organizations beneﬁtted from Oikocredit ﬁnancing, these were soon felt 
to be inadequate.  What has changed?
Improving Social Performance Management
pI58
e-MFP European Dialogue, N°01, 2008
First, within Oikcoredit, there was a desire for greater transparency in reporting on 
whether and how social goals were being realized.  Stakeholders required reliable and 
regular information on whether and to what extent Oikocredit’s social goals were being 
achieved.  
Furthermore, since Oikocredit seeks to realize its social objectives by supporting 
intermediary organizations, the choice of these organizations is crucial.  Do they share 
Oikocredit’s values?  By supporting their work, does Oikocredit reach the poor and help 
to bring about positive change in their lives?  
Finally, the past 5 years has been a period of tremendous growth in proﬁtability and 
sustainability for Oikocredit.  This growth has been accompanied by a greater awareness 
of the importance of social performance and Oikocredit wanted to develop more ways 
of gathering, generating and sharing systematic and standardized information about its 
social performance with investors and the general public. 
3. A variety of SPM initiatives 
In 2000, processes to further develop Oikocredit’s measurement and reporting on social 
performance were set in motion.  Oikocredit’s initial efforts involved the following:
• Training on Impact Assessment for Oikocredit staff  
• Participation as founding member, in the Netherlands Platform for Microﬁnance. 
This has been a valuable forum where Oikocredit is informed about developments 
in Social Performance Management within the microﬁnance sector.
• Deﬁnition of indicators for monitoring  and database development  
• Survey of randomly selected MFI partners to assess awareness and social 
performance management practices.
• Support for and collaboration with MFI partners on a number of Impact Studies 
What are the initial results of these efforts?
4. Outreach Data
Today, with a proﬁle of MFI partners and their operations available in the database, 
Oikocredit is able to respond more objectively and accurately to questions about 
outreach, focus, women’s participation.
Information available as of 30 June 2007 shows that 273 partners reach over 11 
million clients of which over 719,000 directly beneﬁtted from Oikocredit funds.
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Oikocredit has also been able to use the information available to respond to concerns that 
perhaps, only big, mature and proﬁtable, established MFIs are being supported.  Oikocredit’s 
partners, especially in Asia and Africa are a mix of small, medium and large scale40 MFIs.
Proﬁle of Partners by Scale of Operations
Improving Social Performance Management
40 Mix Market Bulletin Deﬁnition of Scale (By portfolio size):
 Large: Latin America= >$15 million; Other Regions=>$8 million;
 Medium: Latin America>$4 million<$15 million; Other Regions>$2 million<$8 million
 Small: Latin America<$4 million; Other Regions<$2 million
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With information on the age of the MFI operations of partners, the database enables 
Oikocredit to monitor the extent to which it is able to reach its goal of supporting more 
new and young MFIs which have relatively more limited access to commercial sources 
of funding and for whom Oikocredit remains an important source of support.  
5. Proﬁle by rural-urban focus
In addition to this basic proﬁle of scope of operations and age, Oikocredit has also 
gained insight into MFI partners’ choice of areas for operations.    
Partners reaching both urban and rural areas are the most numerous, but in Asia 53% 
of MFI partners have a predominantly rural focus and in Africa, a third of partners focus 
primarily on serving rural communities.
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This insight is important for Oikocredit for although the phenomenon of migration may 
be changing rural-urban demographics, in Africa and Asia, the majority of the poor and 
ﬁnancially underserved today are still to be found in rural areas.
By using proxies of percentage of women clients and average loan size as a percentage 
of GNI per capita, Oikocredit has an indication of MFI partners’ outeach to the poor 
and the excluded.
NGOs are the most dominant type of MFI partners in Oikocredit’s portfolio and have 
an average loan outstanding falling at 10% of the per capita GNI of the countries they 
operate in indicating an outreach to what is deﬁned as the ‘low market segment’ – the 
poorer segment of the population.
Improving Social Performance Management
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Information is now available to complement the insight provided by client stories and 
case studies.  Oikocredit has a better proﬁle of its MFI portfolio and is able to conﬁrm 
that Oikocredit’s project criteria and the processes by which these are applied, have led 
to a selection of diverse partners in terms of age, scope of operations and geographical 
focus and that these partners share Oikocredit’s social goals of reaching the poor and 
improving their lives.  However, Oikocredit sees that much more needs to be done.  
6. The SPM Challenge
In general, within the microﬁnance industry, appreciation for social performance 
management has deepened over the years although there still remains ambivalence 
about the effort and time it takes before signiﬁcant information and trends can be 
seen. SPM is considered important and yet SPM work is also still perceived as being 
a “cost center”, not having any direct impact on portfolio or sustainability and to a 
certain extent, peripheral to core business.  Resources for SPM continue to be limited 
– in terms of personnel, systems, tools and capacity for analysis. 
Reaching consensus on what to measure and monitor, deﬁning the indicators, developing 
the systems to capture data systematically and facilitate data processing take time. 
Different countries have different reporting cycles and hammering out an agreement on 
a reporting framework that would yield timely information requires sustained dialogue 
at all levels. Counter checking submitted data for accuracy and revising, modifying 
systems as information comes in from the ﬁeld requires constant attention.  
In the face of all the effort needed, the time it takes before relevant and substantial 
data can be generated and analyzed for trends and conclusions often creates a lot of 
frustration.
Oikocredit has had to deal with all these challenges especially since operations are in 
over 60 countries and are to a large extent, decentralized.  It has been crucial to keep 
things simple, to use information that is already available – both at the level of the 
MFIs and of the industry, to build on systems that are already in place and to develop 
commitment and support for SPM at all levels.
Oikocredit will continue to meet these challenges as it pursues continued improvement 
of its social performance management.  Modiﬁcations to the existing database are 
underway and SPM is also being promoted actively among Oikocredit’s MFI partners. 
The Progress out of Poverty Index developed by the Grameen Foundation is currently 
being piloted by Oikocredit partners in the Philippines and Peru, with the possibility 
of extending this also to partners in Central America.  In Peru, the Oikocredit regional 
ofﬁce is collaborating with MicroFinanza Rating on a Social Rating of an MFI partner; 
in Argentina, two Oikocredit partners have piloted the Cerise Social Audit tool (SPI 
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– Social Performance Indicators) and in the Philippines, partners will be receiving 
training on the tools and methodologies which will allow them to measure their Social 
Return on Investment.  More intensive impact studies will also be conducted with 
selected partners.  
Much more remains to be done and Oikocredit is fully committed to the process now 
underway to deeply embed social performance management within the organization. 
These initiatives are in response to the high level of interest expressed by Oikocredit’s 
MFI partners in social performance and their need for assistance in building capacity in 
the use of various tools and systems for effective SPM.  In the coming years, Oikocredit 
will continue to focus on:
• Promoting awareness of social performance in collaboration with various 
networks.
• Supporting the development of systems and tools for social performance 
measurement building on what MFIs already have available and encouraging the 
integration of these tools and systems into MFI operations.
• Participating in the industry-level dialogue to develop common standards and 
benchmarks for social performance.
• Developing the market for social performance audits and ratings by providing 
incentives or facilitating assistance especially for ﬁrst time audits or ratings. 
The result can only mean better services to clients, more transparency and accountability 
to stakeholders and a more effective allocation of resources in the pursuit of the social 
goals of microﬁnance as well as of Oikocredit.
Improving Social Performance Management
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Albania
Argentina
Armenia
Australia
Azerbaijan
Benin
Bolivia
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Brazil
Bulgaria
Burkina Faso
Cambodia
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
Cote d’Ivoire
Czech Republic
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
El Salvador
Gabon
Georgia
Germany
Ghana
Guatemala
Haiti
Honduras
India
Indonesia
Kazakhstan
Kenya
Kosovo, Republic of
Kyrgyzstan
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Mali
Mauritius
Mexico
Moldova
Mongolia
Montenegro
Mozambique
Netherlands
Nicaragua
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Romania
Russia
Samoa
Senegal
Serbia
Slovak Republic
South Africa
Spain
Switzerland
Tajikistan
Tanzania
Thailand
Togo
Tunisia
Uganda
Ukraine
United Kingdom
United States of America
Zimbabwe
Annexe: Countries in which Oikocredit operates
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How Triodos Bank introduced Triple Bottom Line Reporting 
into the Microﬁnance Sector
Microﬁnance institutions (MFIs) in developing countries are important agents of social 
change. They provide vital ﬁnancial services to low-income groups. These institutions 
often follow the double-bottom line principle, combining social objectives with 
commercial goals. A group of 10 MFIs and Triodos Bank are addressing a new challenge: 
Triple Bottom Line management and reporting ; i.e. they are ﬁnancing ‘green’ business 
solutions and MF clients are encouraged to take environmental impact into account. By 
doing so, MFIs are becoming much broader agents of change. 
Transparency and Sustainability 
in Finance 
GEERT JAN SCHUITE, TRIODOS-FACET
GERA VAN WIJK, TRIODOS BANK
Améliorer le contrôle interne
Project Participants
The following MFIs participate in the Transparency and Sustainability in 
Finance project: 
• ACLEDA Bank in Cambodia (www.acledabank.com.kh)
• BASIX in India (www.basixindia.com)
• Bellwether Microﬁnance Fund in India (www.bellwetherfund.com)
• Centenary Bank in Uganda (www.centenarybank.co.ug)
• FFP FIE in Bolivia (www.ffpﬁe.com.bo)
• FINDESA in Nicaragua (www.ﬁndesa.com.ni)
• K-Rep Bank in Kenya (www.k-repbank.com)
• Mibanco in Peru (www.mibanco.com.pe)
• XacBank in Mongolia  (www.xacbank.mn) 
• Reliance Financial Services in The Gambia (www.reliancegambia.com)
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Sustainability Reporting as a Management Tool and Reporting Framework
In 2004, the Transparency and Sustainability in Finance project41 was initiated by 
Triodos Bank and the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI)42. Participants in this project 
are investee MFIs of the three microﬁnance funds – Triodos-Doen, Hivos-Triodos 
Fund and Triodos Fair Share Fund – managed by Triodos Investment Management. 
These funds provide ﬁnance for over 80 MFIs in developing countries, Central Asia 
and Eastern Europe, with a total portfolio of EUR 120 million as of December 2007. 
Triodos Investment Management is a wholly owned subsidiary of Triodos Bank, the 
leading sustainable bank in Europe. Triodos Bank has formulated its own annual report 
according to the GRI Guidelines since 2001, and was the ﬁrst bank worldwide to 
publish an integrated annual report following these guidelines.
Marilou van Golstein Brouwers, Managing Director of Triodos Investment Management: 
´We see GRI as the best known and globally accepted social and environmental 
reporting framework. With the Transparancy and Sustainability in Finance Project we 
want to assist our investee MFIs in the implementation of GRI Guidelines. They can use 
these Guidelines for  reporting on the economic, social and environmental performance 
of their activities, products and services, but also for decision-making processes and 
sustainability management.´  This principle is known as Triple Bottom Line Reporting, 
also referred to as people, planet and proﬁt. It is both an internal management tool and 
an external reporting framework. 
Phase 1 / 2004 – 2005 Looking for a Standard
Reporting on the Triple Bottom Line is quickly becoming a requirement for businesses 
around the world. A company’s ability to attract capital, build brands and establish 
a solid reputation increasingly depends on how well it communicates not only its 
ﬁnancial, but also its social and environmental goals.   
41 Financial support for the Transparancy and Sustainability in Finance project came from the Hivos 
Foundation, Triodos Foundation and Triodos-Doen Foundation. Since 2007, budget has also been 
provided through SMARTRAC, a capacity building programme for MFIs in Africa who want to 
improve their skills and knowledge in the ﬁeld of risk management and sustainability reporting. 
Funders of the SMARTRAC programme are the European Union, DOEN Foundation and Triodos 
Foundation. 
42 Global Reporting Initiative
 The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) is a multi-stakeholder process and independent institution 
whose mission is to develop and disseminate globally applicable Sustainability Reporting Guidelines. 
Started in 1997, GRI became independent in 2002, and is an ofﬁcial collaborating centre of the 
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP).
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In its ﬁrst phase, the Transparency and Sustainability in Finance project wants to 
anchor the Triple Bottom Line mission of the MFIs and to initiate a process in which 
the MFIs organize sustainability management and use it for planning, monitoring and 
decision-making. 
Social indicators and assessment tools are already available to MFIs43. These 
indicators are the nuts and bolts of any sustainability report, because they measure 
the performance of companies in speciﬁc ﬁelds. As part of the project, Transparency 
and Sustainability in Finance coaches44, senior management of the MFIs and Triodos 
Bank senior investment ofﬁcers selected a list of existing indicators and discussed with 
the different participants. 
There were frequent individual consultations between Triodos Bank, GRI and the MFIs. 
The participating MFIs also regularly shared information among themselves and with 
the project team on project ﬁndings and progress. These contacts brought to light that 
the participants are all very different in their approach and cultural context, but that 
they share similar challenges and solutions when it comes to sustainability reporting. 
Main conclusion
The main conclusion from the meetings and discussions in the ﬁrst phase is that 
GRI reporting is a very useful tool for improving goal-setting, evaluation, strategic 
management and decision-making in MFIs. The participants decided that it is not 
necessary to generate new sustainability reporting guidelines for the microﬁnance 
industry. The existing GRI Guidelines are sufﬁcient to allow an MFI to communicate 
performance results and social, environmental, economic and ﬁnancial aspects of their 
day-to-day business. However, there is a need to develop a set of speciﬁc indicators for 
MFIs, especially in the ﬁeld of social performance. 
All participating MFIs in phase I expressed commitment to include non-ﬁnancial 
information in their 2005 annual reports. Additionally, the MFIs decided to implement 
consultations with internal stakeholders as part of the reporting procedures and to 
ensure active engagement of employees and management in the process. 
Transparency and Sustainability in Finance
43 Examples of initiatives: CGAP Poverty Assessment Tool, Poverty Assessment Research project by 
Accion International, Assessing the Impact of Microﬁnance Services,  SEEP network  SP Progress 
Briefs, Imp-Act initiative, Social Performance Indicators Initiative (SPI) administered by CERISE, 
and various other impact and outreach related initiatives.
44 (inter)national coaches come from consultancy company Triodos Facet and have speciﬁc expertise 
on Triple Bottom Line banking.
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Phase II 2006 - 2007 
There was strong support for a second phase of the Transparency and Sustainability 
in Finance project. Participants expressed their wish to receive overall guidance and 
technical support during the development of their annual reports, speciﬁcally on 
implementation of stakeholder engagement and environmental projects and initiatives. 
Furthermore, participants wanted to continue exchanging information and assist each 
other in developing a set of speciﬁc indicators and methodologies to compliment the 
existing GRI guidelines.
Participants said that most emphasis should lie on:
Organisational aspects such as:
• Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) policy and principles
• Sustainability Performance and Monitoring Systems (Management Systems)
• Stakeholder dialogue
Socio-economic indicators such as:
• Outreach measurement (reaching low-income groups)
• Measuring client’s satisfaction and client retention
• Measuring impact of services on the quality of life of clients at household level
• Measuring impact of services at community level
• Measuring impact of services at enterprise level such as job creation or value 
added 
Environmental indicators especially:
• Energy use
• Water use
• Emissions (CO2) from transportation
• Environmental impact by client’s activities
Social indicators including:
• Employee representation in the decision making process
• Employee ownership
• Policies and programmes on HIV/AIDS
• Human Rights policies
• Policies addressing bribery and corruption
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In 2007, all project participants mentioned in the box (except Reliance Financial 
Services) formulated their annual reports referring to the GRI Guidelines. Marilou 
van Golstein Brouwers: ´A great achievement and we clearly see that the process of 
formulating sustainability reports has raised awareness on social and environmental 
performance issues among our MFI investees. All have indicated that they are dedicated 
and recognise the issues involved 4`5.
Cases
The following four cases show how MFIs are taking up the challenge to implement 
Triple Bottom Line Reporting. 
XacBank in Mongolia
XacBank aims at the low-income groups in Mongolia, offering them a broad range 
of products. The bank plays an active role in remote rural areas by offering loans 
to groups of nomads and herdsmen. It further supports local initiatives for setting 
up savings and credit cooperatives in the so-called ‘soums’, remote communities in 
the country. In addition to the social dimension of their activities the bank has also 
developed products with an environmental impact. The bank offers, for example, a 
ﬁnancial product that enables clients in slums and remote rural areas to purchase fuel-
efﬁcient stoves. By using such stoves for heating and cooking, less fuel is needed, and 
CO2 emissions decrease. XacBank is currently also developing methods to measure 
and report its impact in terms of CO2 prevention. The bank has formed a dedicated 
sustainability team, which meets regularly and serves as the platform for triple bottom 
line management.  XacBank presented its ﬁrst integrated sustainability report, using 
GRI guidelines, in 2007.  
ACLEDA Bank in Cambodia
In May 2006 ACLEDA Bank presented its ﬁrst sustainability report. In it, the bank 
presents detailed information about its energy consumption and CO2 emission and 
includes the results of a survey among 1,200 clients, focused on the question of 
whether the services of ACLEDA Bank really improved their living standards. It has 
announced a dedicated plan, aimed at those clients who claim that their situation 
was not improving, despite the services of ACLEDA Bank. In 2007, in its second 
sustainability report, ACLEDA Bank reported an increase in their clients’ perception of 
income growth, thanks to the bank’s services.    
Transparency and Sustainability in Finance
45 For further information on new developments on GRI, the Triple Bottom Line and Microﬁnance, see 
http://tblmicroﬁnance.blogspot.com.
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Findesa in Nicaragua
Findesa in Nicaragua was the ﬁrst MFI worldwide to publish its annual report (2004) 
according to the GRI Guidelines. In its 2006 Annual Report, Findesa’s management 
claims that “... all our ﬁnancial effort would not be important if we could not balance it 
with triple results adding social and environmental impact to our goals.”
Both Findesa and ACLEDA Bank Annual Reports received nominations for the GRI 
readers choice awards 200846.
Reliance Financial Services in The Gambia
When compared to the MFIs mentioned above, Reliance Financial Services (Reliance) 
differs, as it is a young and (still) small MFI, operational since December 2006. In its 
ﬁrst annual report (published in March 2008) however, Reliance includes a reference 
to Triple Bottom Line banking and uses GRI reporting guidelines (see annexe of this 
article). 
In line with its mission of providing ﬁnancial services to the lower end of the market, 
Reliance is for proﬁt, but at the same time its objectives go beyond proﬁt, to ‘changing 
lives’ in the communities it serves. As a start-up, the management is determined to 
run the affairs of the organisation and measure whether it fulﬁlls its mission, both 
in ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial terms. Reliance’s management: ‘… While the priority 
currently is the credit process and risk management, we recognise the importance of 
setting up the management and reporting system including sustainability issues now, 
as it enables us to collect and manage on the basis of relevant data from inception to 
develop a concrete approach to improve our ‘sustainability management’ in a way that 
is good for the community, the environment and for our business.’
The Future 
GRI has proven to be a good framework and is now used by over ten leading MFIs. 
Within this framework the reporting is not always comparable. A challenge is to come 
to a set of core indicators that can be used by all and coordinated with other initiatives 
like the International Social Performance Task Force. 
Obviously, GRI and Triodos Bank wish to expand the group of participating MFIs. 
Future activities also include installing a group of experts and facilitating (web-based) 
knowledge exchange on GRI reporting and sustainability management. GRI and Triodos 
Bank coaches are currently looking into the possibilities of training local consultants 
46 www.globalreporting.org
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and advisors in a ‘train the trainer’ scheme, and the development of a comprehensive 
framework for use by MFIs, based on current experiences. 
Marilou van Golstein Brouwers: ´Triodos believes that Triple Bottom Line reporting 
helps create socially responsible banks in developing countries and provides the basis 
for an integrated and continuous process of innovation, so that local ﬁnancial systems 
become inclusive in every sense of the word.´
Since 2004, Triodos Investment Management has organised an annual workshop 
to discuss the status and developments of the project and to offer a platform for 
participants to exchange ideas and experiences. It will continue to do so in the coming 
years.
Transparency and Sustainability in Finance
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Annexe: Global Reporting Initiative and Triple Bottom Line Performance Index
Reliance Financial Services Company Limited – Annual Report 200747 
Some indicators mentioned in the GRI reporting Guidelines are available in Reliance’s 
Management Information System, but further efforts are needed to present the 
captured information in a comprehensive way. Other indicators are considered relevant 
for our activities, but these are not yet captured in the GRI list of indicators.
The overview below relates the contents of the annual report on the GRI reporting 
guidelines (version 3.0) where applicable. In addition, it refers to reporting standards 
and guidelines, currently under development by the CGAP Social Performance Task 
Force.
Vision and Strategy
1.1 Statement of Sustainable 
Development
1.2 Statements of key elements
Corporate Proﬁle
2.1 Name 
2.2 Principal activities
2.3 Structure 
2.4 Location of Head Quarters
2.5 Country
2.6 Ownership and Legal Form
2.7 Markets served 
2.8 Key Figures
2.9 Shareholders 
2.10 Awards received
Reporting Parameters
3.1 Reporting period
3.2 Date of most recent report
3.3 Reporting cycle
3.4 Contact point
3.5 Deﬁning report content process
3.6 Boundary
3.7 Statement of reporting limitations
3.8 Outsourced activities
3.9 Data measurement technology
3.10 Re-statement
3.11 Signiﬁcant changes
3.12 GRI content index
3.13 External assurance
Governance 
4.1 Governance structure
4.2 Management structure
4.3 Independence 
4.4 Shareholders recommendations
4.5 Compensation
4.6 Conﬂict of interest
4.7 Qualiﬁcations
4.8 Mission statement
4.9 Oversight
4.10 Performance evaluation
4.11 Precautionary principle
4.12 Endorsement of charters
4.13 Professional memberships
4.14 Stakeholder group
47 www.reliancegambia.com
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Performance Indicators48 
Economic Performance49  
EC 1 Direct economic value added
EC 2 Implication of climate change
EC 3 Deﬁned beneﬁt plans
EC 7 Local hiring
EC 9 Indirect economic impacts
Environmental Performance50 
EN 1 Paper consumption
EN 4 Energy consumption
EN 7 Energy reduction initiatives
EN 22 Waste production
Social Performance51  
LA 10 Staff training
LA 11 Support of life long training
LA 12 Career development
48 Reference to the indicators that are being covered in the annual report, either qualitative 
or quantitative. Other (GRI) indicators are either considered not relevant or information is not 
available.
49 Economic indicators that are not included, but being considered for future reports are : local 
suppliers, local hiring. 
50 Environmental indicators that are not included, but being considered for future reports are : water 
consumption.
51 Social indicators that are not included, but being considered for future reports are : health and 
safety, child labour, security practices.
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52 See www.microﬁnancegateway.org
CGAP Social Performance Task Force 
Indicators52 
Description / reference
Social objectives about outreach (to poor, low 
income, SMEs, women)
Described in the vision and mission 
statement, elaborated under ‘target group 
identiﬁcation’
Social objectives about observing change (in 
the lives of clients, in communities)
Described in the vision and mission 
statement
Board management use of social 
performance information
Described in the Triple Bottom line 
paragraph
Staff incentives Described in the HR chapter
Training on social mission Described in the HR chapter
Entering client poverty level measurement 
systems
In progress
Services geared towards women’s 
empowerment and gender issues
Described under ‘target group identiﬁcation’
Client satisfaction surveys In progress
Dropout rate reviews and exit surveys In progress
Social Responsibility to clients Described in Business Development and 
Advisory paragraph
Social Responsibility to staff Described in the HR chapter
Social Responsibility to community Described in the Triple Bottom line 
paragraph
Social Responsibility to environment Described in the Triple Bottom line 
paragraph
Outreach depth and width information Described in the Product and Services 
paragraph
Achievement of change (3-5 yr clients) In progress
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A Social and Environmental Field Guide for Microﬁnance 
Institutions54
The Netherlands Development Finance Company (FMO), supported by consultants 
Facet and Triple Value, has developed a tool to help MFIs minimize the negative 
environmental and social impacts of the microenterprises they support. The FMO 
environmental and social risk management approach combines positive and negative 
aspects to promote greater environmental and social consciousness among MFI staff 
and clients and to bring clients’ business practices in line with sound environmental 
and social practices.  The FMO approach includes support tools, a course, and internet 
support to help MFIs build an environmental and social (E&S) risk management 
system.55  It is highlighted here as a good example of an integrated approach to 
environmental and social management.  
A premise underlying the FMO approach is that social and environmental factors must 
be included with other (traditional) factors in making loan decisions.  The FMO approach 
breaks the lending process into four phases—application, appraisal, contracting and 
disbursement and reporting—and integrates environmental and social risk assessment 
and management into each phase.  
FMO Environmental and Social 
Risk Management Approach53 
ROBERT BIERENS, FMO
ANTON G. VAN ELTEREN, FMO
Améliorer le contrôle interne
53 The information and much of the language in this section is taken from the FMO website at 
 www.fmo.nl/en/publications/environmental_social_risk_management_tools_MFI.php.
54 http://www.fmo.nl/smartsite.dws?id=531
55 Support tools offered by the FMO include: (1) exclusion list, (2) activity assessment tool, and (3) 
environmental and social evaluation guidelines.  The latter of the three provides guidance on how 
environmental and social risk evaluation and follow-up processes can be implemented in alignment 
with an MFI’s evaluation, approval, monitoring, and reporting processes
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Loan Application
The “exclusion list” is the main instrument of the FMO approach during the loan 
application phase.  The exclusion list is a list of sectors and activities, which, in the 
opinion of FMO, should under no circumstances be ﬁnanced. It includes:
• Activities regulated or prohibited under international agreements and by national 
laws
• Activities that may give rise to signiﬁcant environmental or social problems or that 
may lead to signiﬁcant adverse public reaction
• Activities prohibited under the MFI’s contractual agreement with FMO
MFIs ﬁnanced by FMO are legally obliged to include all the sectors and activities of the 
FMO exclusion list, which include:
• Production or activities involving forced labour or child labour.
• Production of, or trade in, any product or activity deemed illegal under host country 
legislation or regulations or international conventions and agreements.
• Production of, or trade in, weapons and munitions.
• Trade in wildlife, or wildlife products regulated under CITES56.
• Production, or use, or trade in, hazardous materials such as radioactive materials, 
unbounded asbestos ﬁbers, products containing PCBs57 and chemicals subject to 
international phase-outs or bans.
• Commercial logging operations or the purchase of logging equipment for use in any 
primary forest or forest areas with a high biodiversity value, or any other activity 
that leads to substantial clear cutting of such forests.
• Production of, or trade in, pharmaceuticals subject to international phase-outs or 
bans.
• Production of, or trade in, pesticides/herbicides subject to international phase-
outs or bans.
• Production of, or trade in, ozone depleting substances subject to international 
phase-out.
• Drift net ﬁshing in the marine environment using nets in excess of 2.5 km in 
length.
56 CITES = Convention On International Trade in Endangered Species, more information on
 www.cites.org
57 Polychlorinated Biphenyl
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Loan Appraisal
In the loan appraisal phase, the MFI decides whether to make the loan.  In reaching 
this decision, the MFI will consider environmental and social factors in addition to 
traditional loan criteria.  Environmental and social factors include information, or 
projections, about the occurrences of environmental / health and safety / labor risks 
or defaults. 
The source for information on environmental and social factors is the activity 
assessment tool and the sector factsheet.  The former is a matrix summarizing the key 
environmental and social risks for the various sectors in which MFIs work, including 
agriculture, trade, services, and manufacturing. The latter lists observed clients 
behaviors, analyzes whether they pose a risk, discusses the relevance of the behavior, 
and offers suggestions to the client about possible mitigation strategies.  
There are three possible outcomes of social and environmental appraisal:
1. Raise awareness of client about social and environmental impacts
2. Train/educate the client regarding social and environmental improvements
3. Include speciﬁc clauses in the loan contract to mitigate speciﬁc social and 
environmental risks
Which of the three outcomes occurs depends on the social and environmental risk and 
size of the loan, among other factors.
Loan Contracting
In principle FMO does not recommend to put all this strictly in the loan contract. Of 
course it is good if it is possible to do so, but in general we think that in an MFI setting 
it is more fruitful that the loan ofﬁcer discusses the required actions with the client, 
more in terms of recommendations. For example the recommendations or contract 
clauses of an MFI could be: 
• Operate and maintain machines and equipment professionally and with proper 
(safety)measures
• Don’t employ children
• Use (toxic) chemicals with proper safeguards and store them properly
• Comply with accepted standards and regulations regarding land cultivation
• Reduce the amount of waste by improving the process or recycling
• Prevent land erosion or degradation
• Take precautions in waste disposal, not dump liquid or solid waste in public places
FMO Environmental and
Social Risk Management Approach 
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• Avoid, reduce, control processes that pollute the air
• Take steps to protect one’s own health and that of  employees, clients, or 
neighbors
• Comply with municipal regulations on environmental protection, health and safety, 
hygiene, labor
• Comply with government regulations
In addition to the standard contractual language, the MFI may also specify speciﬁc 
loan clauses aimed at mitigating risks speciﬁc for that loan.  In most cases, these can 
be simple adaptations of the standard clauses.
Reporting
Once a lending decision has been made, the next step is to integrate the information 
into the MFI’s management information system (MIS).  Information entered into the 
MIS includes:
• Whether an environmental and social appraisal has been performed
• What the most important environmental and social aspects of a client or a loan 
are
• What clauses have been added to the contract
• Whether a client has made the necessary improvements 
Once this information has been logged into the MIS, the MFI can utilize it in a number 
of ways:
• monitor progress and compliance with loan clients’ contractual obligations,
• assess status and progress for future loan appraisals with the same client,
• generate cross loan-book overviews about the nature and magnitude of the 
environmental and social risks, and 
• report to investors and donors about environmental impacts.
FMO is investigating the possibilities to produce a speciﬁc set of monitoring indicators 
based on the experiences of MFIs using the tool.
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1. Background on the European Fund for Southeast Europe
Building on reﬁnancing initiatives managed by KfW in Southeast Europe, the European 
Fund for Southeast Europe (EFSE) was established as a Luxembourg investment 
fund (SICAV-SIF) in December 2005 for an unlimited duration. The Fund Manager is 
Oppenheim Asset Management Services. Frankfurt School of Finance & Management 
acts as advisor and supports the fund management. 
“The Fund aims to foster economic development and prosperity in the Southeast 
Europe region through the sustainable provision of additional development ﬁnance, 
notably to micro and small enterprises (MSEs) and to private households, via qualiﬁed 
ﬁnancial institutions”. 
It implements this mission currently in nine countries: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Bulgaria, Kosovo, FYR Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Romania and Serbia. It 
will start operations in Ukraine in the coming months. In these countries, the Fund 
reﬁnances microﬁnance banks and organisations, commercial banks, and non-bank 
ﬁnancial institutions, such as leasing companies, which serve the micro- and small 
business segments or the low-income housing ﬁnance segment. 
The Fund has an innovative funding structure: donors and governments provide a ﬁrst-
loss tranche (European Commission, Austrian, German and Swiss governments as well 
as DANIDA on behalf of the Danish government), International Financial Institutions 
supply mezzanine capital (EBRD, FMO IFC, KfW, EIB), while more than 30 percent of 
committed funds are sourced from commercial ﬁnanciers in the form of Notes (Bank 
Sal. Oppenheim, Deutsche Bank, Omidyar-Tufts Microﬁnance Fund, Credit Cooperatif,). 
The ﬁrst-loss tranche is used as a risk cushion to offer investment opportunities to 
institutional and private investors interested in combining attractive ﬁnancial returns 
with demonstrated social impact. In this way the Fund works as a true public-private 
Social Performance Monitoring 
in the European Fund for 
Southeast Europe 
MARTIN HEIMES, FRANKFURT SCHOOL OF FINANCE & MANAGEMENT
KLAUS MAURER, FRANKFURT SCHOOL OF FINANCE & MANAGEMENT
Améliorer le contrôle interne
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development partnership. Through this mechanism, private capital can be leveraged, 
substantially enlarging the total amount of funds available for development purposes. 
Up to seven times the ﬁrst-loss tranche can be raised for the target group, representing 
signiﬁcant leverage.
At the end of 2007, the Fund has made investments worth EUR 377 million with 
50 partner lending institutions (PLIs). The PLIs include 8 commercial banks with 
majority foreign ownership, 15 commercial banks with majority local ownership, 7 
microﬁnance banks, 18 non-licensed micro credit organisations and 2 non-bank 
ﬁnancial institutions. Investments are mainly made in the form of senior loans, but 
subordinated debt and guarantees are also granted. Recently, the Fund has also made 
its ﬁrst equity investment in a rural MFI in Kosovo. 
At inception, EFSE was targeting capitalization of EUR 500 million by 2010, an amount 
which was already achieved by year-end 2007. Until 2012, the Fund is expected to 
reﬁnance 174,000 loans to micro and small enterprises and farmers, reﬁnance around 
43,000 loans to families to rebuild or modernise their homes, and contribute to the 
creation of around 43,000 jobs. 
The fund is a socially responsible lender that adopts high standards of business ethics 
in its operations and also expects its partners to stick to these ethical principles. In 
this regard, the Fund requires PLIs to adopt adequate credit technologies that cater 
to the speciﬁc needs of the target group and ensure equal access to end-borrowers. 
EFSE also applies a comprehensive set of guidelines to ensure that PLIs grant loans in 
compliance with international environmental and social best practices. Finally, EFSE 
also expects that PLIs are engaged in fair business practices: for instance, that they 
refrain from lending practices that lead to over-indebtedness, and that they provide 
transparent information to their clients and public at large.
2. Social Performance Monitoring of the Fund
The rationale to include social performance criteria in the monitoring and evaluation 
activities of the Fund stems directly from its mission. As the target groups are primarily 
deﬁned as micro- and small enterprises and low-income private households for housing 
investments, the Fund needs to look beyond pure ﬁnancial performance data of the 
Fund and PLIs through which it works, and include social performance vis-à-vis the 
target groups as well. Social performance criteria are therefore engrained into the 
Fund’s operations in the following three areas:
• Selection process of PLIs in view of social performance
• Regular monitoring of PLIs’ development performance
• Annual in-depth evaluation of development impact 
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2.1. Selection process of PLIs
The Fund carries out eligibility checks and on-site due diligences with each potential 
PLI. Both serve the purpose to assess the ﬁnancial viability of an investment as well 
as a number of social dimensions. Firstly, the due diligence and the eligibility checks 
establish whether a potential PLI has a signiﬁcant outreach to the target groups of 
EFSE. In this regard, EFSE requires that potential PLI perceives business with the 
target groups as one of its core activities into which it invests and grows. The Fund 
subsequently engages in a discussion of the particular loan portfolio of the PLI or 
potential PLI, i.e. the capacity to grow this portfolio and the percentage of growth that 
can be reﬁnanced by the Fund. The Fund also actively supports PLIs in developing new 
products for the target groups or improving its services to them in general. However, 
the Fund does not start collaboration with an institution that does not show sufﬁcient 
target group orientation at the outset. 
Secondly, the Fund scrutinises through its due diligence studies whether the potential 
PLI complies with the Fund’s social and environmental standards. The Fund’s standards 
are a synthesis of the standards of its IFI shareholders (EBRD, KfW, FMO and IFC), 
and are reviewed during the due diligence in the form of a checklist (e.g. questions 
on the integration of environmental aspects in risk management or the issue of staff 
treatment). Furthermore, a targeted analysis of a sample of a potential PLI’s portfolio 
is carried out, and detailed follow-up analysis is started in case any problematic 
investments are detected.
Compliance with the Fund’s social and environmental standards is ensured through 
the inclusion of these standards in the investment contracts. The PLI subsequently 
implements the standards in its investment contracts with clients as well as 
implementation support of social and environmental factors into the PLI’s risk 
management systems. To this end, the Fund invites PLIs to training courses on 
social and environmental management (e.g. courses offered by FMO), and the EFSE 
Development Facility (see section 3.2.) organises dedicated social and environmental 
management courses.
Thirdly, the Fund scrutinises the integrity of institutions, and especially their 
shareholders, prior to an investment. A standard checklist is part of the due diligence, 
and if any red ﬂags are raised during, or prior to, the due diligence, separate in-depth 
integrity studies are commissioned.
All three areas are reﬂected in the investment proposals that are submitted to the 
Fund’s Investment Committee. In case of signiﬁcant shortcomings of an institution in 
these areas, an investment will not be considered, i.e. either by not being presented 
to, or declined by, the Committee. Through the EFSE Development Facility, the Fund 
Social Performance Monitoring
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also has the opportunity to implement targeted technical assistance to mitigate 
critical areas as a condition for an investment. 
2.2. Regular monitoring of PLIs’ development performance
Focussing on development outcomes, key development performance indicators 
measuring outreach and sustainability of the Fund’s operations are monitored 
quarterly. Providing detailed data in this regard is important for the public 
shareholders of the Fund who watch over the development orientation of the 
Fund. 
Monitoring the criteria entails that the Fund requires its PLIs to report details 
about sub-loans that have been granted within the respective reﬁnanced MSE 
or housing portfolio. Consequently, the Fund is currently monitoring more than 
68,000 individual sub-loans. In order to keep the reporting burden on the PLIs 
as light as possible, the Fund works with a web-based reporting system, in which 
PLIs can easily upload data ﬁles that have been created by their standard MIS. 
This procedure requires that the regular monitoring is restricted to data that 
every single one of the Fund’s PLIs track in their MIS as part of their ordinary 
business activity.
Target group outreach is certainly the most important indicator for measuring 
social performance. The Fund has decided to use the following indicators to 
monitor outreach:
• Number of borrowers. This indicator gives an idea of the bread of the 
outreach, i.e. the number of clients or beneﬁciaries who have obtained 
ﬁnancing through the Fund’s reﬁnancing.
• Average sub-loan balance outstanding and percentage of sub-loans 
outstanding below EUR 10,000. These two indicators give an idea of the 
depth of outreach, i.e. the extent to which the investments of the Fund are 
reaching down in the market. Certainly, using ﬁgures on outstanding loan 
amounts are only a second best solution compared to amounts disbursed. 
The reason, again, behind this choice is the practicability of the system, 
as it is easier for the Fund’s partner institutions to report on their current 
portfolio than on their historical disbursements. 
• Distribution of sub-borrowers by economic sector. The Fund monitors sectoral 
distribution according to four categories: production, trade, agriculture, and 
services.
• Sub-loan Purpose. Regarding loans to MSEs, the Fund monitors the share 
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of ﬁ nancing for working capital and ﬁ xed assets, respectively, to have an idea 
of the contribution to the capital stock generation in the region. With regard to 
housing loans, the Fund monitors loan purposes according to the categories of 
home improvement, construction, and purchase.
• Maturity of sub-loans. Since the Fund grants long-term reﬁ nancing, it monitors to 
which extent the maturity of the reﬁ nancing is translated into a longer maturity for 
the target group.
Regarding the sustainability of the Fund’s investments in its PLIs, the Fund monitors the 
quality of the sub-loan portfolio, i.e. the portfolio at risk of a part of the portfolio. This 
certainly gives only an indication of the overall sustainability of the PLI’s operations. 
The Fund thus monitors the overall portfolio quality of all its PLIs within the context of 
its risk monitoring system.
Development Performance in a Nutshell (all ﬁ gures as of December 2007)
Social Performance Monitoring
in the European Fund for Southeast Europe
Number of active borrowers
68,691
Subloan portfolio
295,8 million EUR
Average loan outstanding
4,307 EUR
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Subloan Portfolio 
by Product
based on loan amount
Development
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MSE/Rural MSE Loan Overview by
Economic Sector
based on loan amount
Loan Size
Loan Purpose
based on loan amount
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Housing Loan Overview by
Loan Purpose
based on loan amount
Maturity
based on loan amount
2.3. Annual in-depth evaluations (including assessment of development impact)
While the regular quarterly monitoring is highly standardised, the Fund looks at other 
dimensions of social performance and development impact through ‘Annual Impact 
Studies’, whose scope is deﬁned in a more ﬂexible and comprehensive manner. These 
in-depth evaluations are carried out by independent research/consultancy institutions 
and include, among others (such as client satisfaction studies), the assessment of 
development impact at three levels: the level of the ultimate target group, the level of 
the PLI and the level of the ﬁnancial sector and economy, including compliance with 
environmental and social standards. 
The ﬁrst ‘Annual Impact Study’, conducted in 2006, focussed on the impact of the 
Fund’s reﬁnancing of housing loan portfolios in Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina by 
providing answers to the following questions: 
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1. Development impact on the ultimate target group
• Were low income households reached? Were disadvantaged groups reached? 
• How important were loans for housing improvements? 
• What were the improvements in the borrowers’ housing conditions?
• What was the impact on the household budgets and on the general well 
being?
2. Development impact on the PLIs 
• Were new products introduced? How important was TA in this respect?
• Is the housing lending part of mainstream business? Is it proﬁtable and 
sustainable?
• What was the impact on the competitiveness of the PLI? 
• How do the borrowers assess the loan product and the PLI’s service?
3. Development impact on the ﬁnancial sector and economy, including compliance 
with environmental and social standards
• Was there a demonstration effect within the sector regarding housing 
lending? 
• How can policy makers contribute to the development of housing ﬁnance?
• What is the environmental effect of housing loans?
• How can the Fund increase the development impact of its investments?
The 2006 Study showed that on the end-borrower level, positive outcomes for the 
overall quality of housing have translated into wider improvements of the conditions 
and livelihoods of households in both countries. The majority of the clients have 
used the loans for home improvement (more than 60%), and the majority improved 
bathrooms (57%) and kitchens (50%). Households positively responded to questions 
about effects of the heat retention of their house, the noise level and their general 
appreciation of it. Only 7% of the clients would have carried out the improvement in 
the same way without access to a loan.
On the PLI level, all but one PLI stated that without EFSE (or its predecessors), they 
would not have started housing lending – due to TA and the availability of long-term 
reﬁnancing. All PLIs considered the product to be proﬁtable and of moderate risk, and 
the majority has built a signiﬁcant housing portfolio from their own or other non-EFSE 
resources over time – in this regard, EFSE funding was leveraged by a factor of six for 
the target group. The wider ﬁnancial sector responded as well, implementing similar 
products as did the EFSE PLIs. It can thus be claimed that the Fund has opened up a 
new market for the ﬁnancial sector in the two sample countries. 
Social Performance Monitoring
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The full study report can be downloaded at www.efse.lu.
The second ‘Annual Impact Study’ on MSE lending, the core area of involvement of 
the Fund, is in the process of being ﬁnalised. It addresses primarily the employment 
effects of MSE ﬁnancing, certainly one of the main indicators of social performance. 
Overall, the study is expected to serve the following aims:
• Establish a sound base for the estimation of employment effects of MSE lending 
reﬁnancing
• Conﬁrm (or deny) that MSE ﬁnance has positive and very few negative environmental 
impacts in Southeast Europe (SEE) and deﬁne areas or segments in MSE ﬁnance 
where negative impacts might be expected in SEE
• Develop an innovative approach to scrutinise “responsibility” in the delivery of 
ﬁnancial services
• Produce data regarding the “responsibility” of MSE lending in PLIs to guide follow-
up initiatives etc.
The study results are expected for Summer 2008 and will be posted on the Fund’s 
website.
3. Institutional assurance of the development mission
3.1. Incentive structure for fund manager
The monitored performance criteria that were mentioned in section 2.2. have been 
made part of the performance evaluation of the management of the Fund. Targets for 
these criteria are set annually, and 40% of the annual management bonus is determined 
with reference to them. 
Social performance relevant to management bonus criteria for 2007:
• Number of PLIs with active investment (weight 10%): 48 (target) vs. 50 
(achieved) 
• Number of sub-loans outstanding (weight 10%): 47,500 (target) vs. 68,691 
(achieved)
• Average sub-loan amount outstanding (weight 7%): EUR 5,200 (target) vs. EUR 
3,696 (achieved)
• Share of sub-loans disbursed below EUR 10,000 (weight 7%): >80% (target) vs. 
90% (achieved)
• Sub-loan portfolio quality (weight 7%): PAR 30 of 3% (target) vs. PAR 30 of 
2.1% (achieved)
Forty percent of the management bonus is based on the Fund’s ﬁnancial performance 
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(investment portfolio, arrears on loans to PLIs, composite yield), and 20% on qualitative 
indicators regarding efﬁciency, effectiveness and quality of management services.
3.2. EFSE Development Facility
The EFSE Development Facility (DF) is a trust fund which complements EFSE’s 
ﬁnancial assistance to partner lending institutions with non-ﬁnancial services, 
supporting technical assistance, consulting and training in areas such as strategy and 
transformation, product development and up/down-scaling and responsible ﬁnance. 
Grant contributions for the Facility are obtained from various donors (including the 
BMZ, DANIDA, FMO and SDC), from VR Leasing as a ﬁrst private contribution58, and 
from the Fund itself through an annual contribution from its income. The DF is steered 
by a committee consisting of representatives of its major contributors, and its day-to-
day management is carried out by the fund manager and the fund advisor.
The DF has launched the following programmes that are strengthening the social 
performance of the Fund’s PLIs and mobilising stakeholders of the ﬁnancial sectors 
under its geographical coverage:
- ‘Social Responsible Finance Programme’ supporting socially responsible ﬁnancial 
service provision with technical expertise and/or funding: So far, the DF has organised 
a responsible ﬁnance conference jointly with the Serbian national bank and co-ﬁnanced 
a client education booklet of a PLI. Two studies looking at access to ﬁnance and the 
responsibility of service provision in Bosnia and in Moldova are planned for 2008. 
Furthermore, the DF will support PLIs in a transparency campaign, and to carry out 
sales and marketing trainings that contain sessions on responsible client relationship 
management and transparency. 
- ‘Housing Energy Efﬁciency Programme’ supporting PLIs in the development and 
marketing of housing energy efﬁciency loan products: The Fund is piloting its ﬁrst 
investments in the area of housing energy efﬁciency. The DF supports these pilot 
projects through technical assistance as well as a direct contribution to the marketing 
budget of the pilot institutions. The pilot projects will implement dedicated housing 
energy efﬁciency products, targeting clients that carry out home improvements, with 
the aim to raise the home improvement standard with regard to their energy efﬁciency. 
A study (the Annual Impact Study 2008) will accompany the pilot and assess its 
58 VR Leasing AG is part of the German cooperative ﬁnancial services association known as 
FinanzVerbund, which belongs to the Volksbanken und Raiffeisenbanken organisation. The 
company provides sales- and investment-ﬁnancing products including leasing and credit facilities 
for SMEs throughout Europe.
Social Performance Monitoring
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effectiveness. 
4. Conclusion and outlook
EFSE’s shareholders consider the Fund as a ﬂagship initiative, which implements a very 
innovative approach to provide reﬁnancing for the region. In this regard, the shareholders 
have ensured that the Fund is also innovative in its handling of social performance 
aspects, including its monitoring system, and acts as a trendsetter. Especially with 
regards to the transparency of social performance, the Fund sets standards through its 
regular monitoring and the conducted studies.
Being one of the largest reﬁnancing vehicles world-wide and an important funding 
source in the SEE region, the Fund also takes up its responsibility in the arena of policy 
dialogue. Advancing issues such as responsible ﬁnance or housing energy efﬁciency 
ﬁnance with regulators and policy makers is on the agenda of the Fund as well.
The Fund has had good experience with its current social performance monitoring 
system. Particularly, the division in standardised regular reporting, which comprises 
basic indicators and ﬂexible annual studies that are able to address areas not monitored 
by the PLIs themselves, has proven to be very successful.
Financial reporting standards for institutions involved in the provision of micro credit, 
as well as to some extent for reﬁnancing institutions, have become fairly standardised. 
Improvements in social performance measurement and reporting will become necessary, 
and ultimately more standardised, especially in anticipation that social investors will 
become more educated and will no longer take for granted the positive development 
impact of micro credit. In this light, the Fund would like to continue its efforts as a 
socially responsible investor to advance the cause of social performance reporting.
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Designing a Tool to Assess Vulnerability Among Members of a Coffee Producers 
Cooperative in the Peruvian Amazon
SIDI (Solidarité Internationale pour le Développement et l’Investissement) is a private 
company established in 1983 by the Comité Catholique contre la Faim et pour le 
Développement (CCFD) to support microﬁnance in developing countries. SIDI’s 
mission is to offer technical and ﬁnancial support to local organizations providing 
ﬁnancial services to populations excluded from the traditional banking sector. With 
nearly 60 partners (NGOs, microcredit organizations, farmer organizations, savings 
and credit cooperatives, credit union networks, microﬁnance institutions, banks, 
non-bank ﬁnancial institutions) in over 30 countries, SIDI is both an investor and 
service provider, offering equity, loans and guarantees as well as short and long-term 
technical assistance (TA) to strengthen governance, foster operational autonomy and 
encourage institutionalization of local ﬁnancing structures. To this end, SIDI relies on 
“the solidarity chain for ﬁnancing”: Northern-based institutions and individuals make 
resources available to SIDI (public and private shareholders and savers who opt to share 
the income generated from their savings deposits), which are used by local, pro-poor 
ﬁnancial service providers in developing countries. By the end of 2006, SIDI’s portfolio 
was valued at 6.6 million Euros (57% loans, 40% equity and 3% guarantees).
Within the framework of its monitoring and TA activities, SIDI has created a Social 
Viability and Development (SVD) department. This department aims to promote 
discussion on the social objectives of local ﬁnancing structures, including how they 
are pursued and how coherent they are with the institution’s overall mission. Guided by 
a vision of socially sustainable development, this department monitors the relevance 
of SIDI’s activities and those of its partners in terms of fostering sustainable social 
change, so that shareholders may be better informed. 
The objective of this paper is to present an example of the activities conducted by 
the SVD department with one of SIDI’s Latin American partners. It describes the 
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development of a monitoring and evaluation (M&E) tool to assess the vulnerability of 
the members of CAC La Florida, a Central Amazonian coffee producers cooperative 
located in the Chanchamayo province of Peru. 
Project background 
As a cooperative, La Florida espouses certain social values:
• Pursuit of both economic and social development
• Uniﬁed growth of the network (member-driven governance, strategic decision-
making during general assemblies where one member = one voice)
• Decentralized management thanks to the 17 Integral Development Committees 
(Comites de Desarrollo Integral-CDI) which, via elected ofﬁcials, represent each 
community covered by the cooperative and participate in establishing economic 
and social action plans
• Participation in community development (infrastructure improvement, road 
maintenance, etc...)
• Promotion of education (support to schools, distribution of school supplies), 
training (establishment of a training center) and information dissemination (plans 
to start a trimestrial information bulletin).
La Florida’s operations are based on strong social values and a clear social mission. 
The cooperative considers that to reach its objective of social viability, it needs to have 
an integrated approach to family production units, incorporating social and economic 
dimensions. 
Sustainability of family units requires: 
• At the social level: cohesiveness; shared vision; projects that take into account 
each member of the family unit (so that young people have perspectives for the 
future and older members do not represent a burden); integration of native Indian 
communities and their cultural diversity; improved living conditions, especially in 
terms of housing, health, infrastructure; ability to cooperate and negotiate with 
others.
• At the economic level: diversiﬁcation of agricultural and non-agricultural activities 
to avoid dependence on coffee; training young people so they will stay in rural 
areas, have the skills to manage their plots and assume responsibilities in the 
cooperative; develop economic activities, taking care to conserve natural resources, 
respect the environment and expand infrastructure.
As a way to achieve sustainability of family production units, the cooperative has already 
pursued a number of activities such as creating a youth training center, establishing a 
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savings and credit institution (CREDIFLORIDA), launching an organic coffee program 
and participating in infrastructure improvement works.
Nonetheless, the cooperative wants to further strengthen its members’ social viability. 
In order to develop a coherent action plan to do so, it decided to conduct a study of each 
of its 17 CDIs. The studies involved establishing an activity calendar based on gender; 
creating a map for each zone where family units are located, with data on production 
and infrastructure; applying a questionnaire on the history and characteristics of the 
zone; conducting a participatory SWOT analysis with each CDI and assessing the family 
units for their level of vulnerability. 
As one of the cooperative’s partners, SIDI was called upon to assist La Florida in this 
process. Over the course of several missions, SIDI and La Florida jointly deﬁned the 
objectives, methodology and ultimately developed a tool to assess the socio-economic 
situation of the cooperative’s families.
Presentation and implementation 
With this tool, the cooperative aims to categorize family units according to their degree 
of vulnerability, comprehend the rationale behind their internal functioning, understand 
their ﬁnancial and capacity-building needs, design a program of relevant activities and 
evaluate effects and changes on family units. The cooperative’s education, technical 
and management units all contributed to deﬁning the variables and indicators needed 
to differentiate family units and categorize them. La Florida’s integrated approach 
made it necessary to take into account both social and economic elements, as well as 
the context. 
As a basis for the tool, SIDI drew from the capability theory of Amartya Sen. The 
fundamental idea is that a family is vulnerable if it does not have the capabilities to 
make the necessary changes to protect itself from negative events. These “capabilities” 
are made up of the family’s “potentialities”, i.e. their social, human, ﬁnancial and 
physical capital, as well as the “opportunities” offered by the environment. These 
“opportunities” correspond to a context that may or may not permit families to develop 
their “potentialities”. Another important element in this analysis of vulnerability is the 
diversiﬁcation of productive activities.
The tool developed by SIDI was based on this approach. A series of variables were 
deﬁned for each type of capital and opportunity, based on discussions with members 
and analysis of the context. For example, a variable for migrant remittances, an element 
of ﬁnancial capital, was not retained, cooperative members judging it irrelevant in 
their context. For each variable, indicators were deﬁned to determine whether family 
units were “vulnerable”, “under development” or “viable”. The following table offers an 
overview of the indicators used.
Monitoring and Evaluating Social Viability
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Variables for characterization and classiﬁcation of family units
Variables Viable Under Development Vulnerable
Internal Social Capital
Primary decision-maker Father, mother, children Father and mother or 
children
Father or mother
Leadership capacity Existent Non existent
Agreement/Harmony Existent Non existent
Shared values Good Average Poor
Role of the woman (self-
esteem, participation, family 
planning)
Good Average Poor
External Social Capital
Integration/recognition by the 
community
Leaders with 
responsibilities
Recognition Isolation, tension, 
discrimination
Participation in cooperative 
life: responsibilities
Has responsibilities Could have 
responsibilities
Cannot have 
responsibilities
Physical Capital
Land
Landowner Property title Certiﬁcate of possession Communal title
Size of plot ≥ 10 ha Between 5 & 10 ha ≤ 5 ha
Area cultivated ≥ 5 ha Between 5 & 3 ha < 3 ha
Altitude ≥ 1200m Between 900 & 1200m ≤ 900m
Yields per ha ≥ 15qq Between 10 & 15qq ≤ 10qq
Value of machinery ≥ 4000ns Between 2000 & 4000ns59 ≤ 2000ns
Human Capital
Education
Educational level Post secondary Primary or secondary None
Dependants
Age ≥ 40 yrs Between 30 & 40 ≤ 30 yrs & the elderly
59 1 Euro = 4.263 nuevos soles as of 10 April 2008.
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Civil status Married, concubine Single/widowed
No. of dependants ≤ 3 Between 7 & 3 > 7
No. of grown children ≥ 6 Between 3 & 6 ≤ 3
Housing
Perception of quality of 
housing
Good Average Poor
Financial Capital
Monthly family income (coffee 
deposited at the cooperative)
≥ 600ns Between 600  & 300ns ≤ 300ns
Net monthly income per person 
(coffee deposited at the 
cooperative)
≥ 120ns Between 120 & 60ns ≤ 60ns
Savings Existent Non Existent
Share capital and contributions 
to cooperative
5000ns Between 2000 & 5000ns 2000ns
Indebtedness of family unit Existent Non existent
Diversiﬁcation of Activities
Agricultural activities Diversiﬁed Little diversiﬁcation Not diversiﬁed
Non-agricultural activities Several At least one None
Forest activities Forest reserves and 
plantations
Forest reserves or 
plantations
Neither forest reserves 
nor plantations
Opportunities
Access to health care Yes No
Access to education Primary and secondary Only primary
Access to markets Good Average Poor
Access to quality inputs Good Average Poor
Access to drinkable water Yes No
Access to electricity Yes No
Access to information 
(primarily economic 
information)
Frequently Occasionally Rarely
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Once these variables and indicators were deﬁned, a questionnaire was designed to 
collect the necessary information from a sample of 30% of the all families in each 
CDI. Families were selected on the basis of the surface area planted with coffee, which 
seemed to be the most relevant criteria of vulnerability for members. Because of their 
intimate knowledge of each family, the technical staff from each CDI was responsible 
for data collection.
SIDI’s in-ﬁeld technical support started processing these questionnaires by entering 
data in a tool designed in Excel. Data had to be re-processed and the Excel tool 
adapted due to problems interpreting the questionnaire and the lack of responses to 
certain questions (members were reticent about sharing ﬁnancial data), but information 
for each family was ultimately entered into the database. At the same time, visits were 
made to each CDI to conduct the participatory SWOT analyses to collect data for 
the “opportunities” variable. Once this data was processed by the Excel tool, it was 
possible to attribute a “grade” to each family for each variable. 
When this part of the analysis was completed, data was transferred to a database so 
that results could be disaggregated at the level of each CDI.  Indeed, the cooperative’s 
objective was not to offer personalized follow-up (which would have been impossible 
due to sampling), but have an overall vision of the family units in each CDI. Processing 
this data made it possible to visualize via graphs the strengths and weaknesses of each 
Committee, both in terms of families’ potentialities and their level of vulnerability in 
light of the overall context. 
The analysis revealed that in many cases, as in the example below, family units have 
strong potential, expressed as a grade for the “capital” variable, but they are unable to 
optimize this potential due to an unfavorable environment that makes them vulnerable 
and brings down their overall vulnerability grade. As the example shows, an assessment 
of only the “potentialities” of family units, i.e. the various types of capital, ﬁnds that 
26% of all families are “viable” and 74% are “under development”. These results 
change signiﬁcantly when “opportunities” are taken into account, i.e. the context. No 
families fall under the “viable” category and 17% become “vulnerable”. Presenting the 
data in a radar-style graph makes it possible to determine the forms, levels and criteria 
of vulnerability most present in each CDI.
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Results
Information from the database was summarized in a report drafted by SIDI which 
explained the results and conclusions for each CDI. The report also offered 
recommendations for future activities that could reduce member vulnerability, namely 
training, ﬁnancial support and investment in infrastructure.
This socio-economic study combined with the mapping exercise, activity calendar and 
SWOT analyses have helped the cooperative better understand its members and the 
geographical areas it works in, as well as design a strategic plan that is coherent 
with its members’ social characteristics. On the basis of this strategic plan, which 
deﬁnes priorities per zone and area of activity, each CDI will implement its own action 
plan.  There are also plans to present the results of this study to each CDI, to allow 
comparison across Committees and encourage less “viable” CDIs to learn from the 
strategies of the more “viable” ones. These knowledge sharing meetings will moreover 
offer the occasion to start implementing the action plans of each CDI.
The analysis also provides the cooperative with a baseline from which to measure the 
evolution of member vulnerability. Indeed, La Florida intends to reapply the tool in 
two to three years to assess the evolution of the same member sample, to evaluate 
the results of its activities. The cooperative’s Education department, in charge of the 
project, was particularly involved with SIDI ﬁeld mission, so as to adopt and learn the 
ins and outs of the tool for the next time around. SIDI also designed a user’s guide 
with this in mind.
The tool is not standardized. It is based on theories of vulnerability analysis, but 
indicators were deﬁned according to La Florida’s speciﬁc context and designed to 
meet the cooperative’s current need for a socio-economic analysis of its members and 
its future need for a monitoring and evaluation tool. It cannot be transposed as is into 
another context; the variables and indicators must be adapted to each environment. As 
this was SIDI’s ﬁrst foray into designing M&E tools, the ﬁeld mission also conducted an 
analysis of the technical and methodological challenges it encountered in the process 
and reﬂected on opportunities for improvement, so as to be able to repeat the exercise 
even more successfully with other partners interested in assessing member/client 
vulnerability.
This example illustrates SIDI’s approach to social viability, the latter referring to 
the sustainability of social changes resulting from the activities of local ﬁnancial 
providers in view of engendering socially sustainable development. SIDI recognizes 
the importance of improving the well-being capabilities of all; the importance of social 
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cohesiveness, equity and reducing inequality; and the need to strengthen potentialities 
and opportunities for families to reduce their vulnerability. SIDI’s approach is not 
universal, nor is it a model to be applied systematically to its partners. Rather, it is 
redeﬁned on a case-by-case basis, to best respond to the needs, mission and speciﬁc 
context of each partner. The goal is not just to measure the effects of services, but 
also encourage partners to reﬂect on how they can improve their social performance. 
This case-by-case approach is nonetheless time-consuming, since tools, methods 
and strategies cannot be replicated. Moreover, it requires strong commitment and 
availability of the partner organization, something that is not always easy to ensure, 
given the lack of resources and means that plague many local ﬁnancial providers.
This approach reﬂects SIDI’s overall strategy. It is based on the concept of partnership, 
which implies a long-term relationship, risk sharing and a shared vision of development 
with local organizations that take many forms. It fosters a shared learning dynamic that 
respects the speciﬁcities of each partner. Moreover, it is coherent with SIDI’s dual role 
as investor and service provider, as it promotes a deeper understanding of partners, 
involves personalized assistance over time, and facilitates sustainable ﬁnancial service 
provision, an enabling environment, empowerment of local actors and enduring 
improvements to clients in the long-term.
Monitoring and Evaluating Social Viability
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This edition of European Dialogue examines an essential issue that is fundamental to 
current developments in microﬁnance. Social performance assessment is increasingly 
accepted as an approach that can improve impact on clients while strengthening 
ﬁnancial performance in the medium term. Two or three years ago, social performance 
was still a marginal issue. It was often considered potentially damaging for MFIs, 
which must not be ‘diverted’ from their ﬁnancial performance. The methods used 
for social performance assessment were judged overly subjective and not sufﬁciently 
‘mathematical’, and it supposedly simply added to the burden of reporting for 
operators.
However, an increasing number of actors in the sector today recognise the importance of 
social performance and are working to promote awareness of its principal dimensions: 
targeting the poor and excluded, encouraging the creation of ‘decent’ jobs through 
support to small businesses, adapting services to clients, increasing beneﬁts to them 
and their families, and ensuring MFIs’ social responsibility towards their employees, 
their clients, the community and the environment. 
This development has been sustained by the involvement of several MFIs and their 
networks. These MFIs share the vision of the sector’s social mission and of the 
possibility of reconciling social and ﬁnancial performance. Practice shows that positive 
relationships are already ﬂourishing, as demonstrated by the examples presented in this 
Dialogue such as Ashi in the Philippines, Reliance Financial Services in The Gambia, 
la CAC La Florida in Peru, etc or other examples in the microﬁnance sector:  Promujer 
in Bolivia, Crédit Rural de Guinée, and even small institutions such as Busaa Gonofaa 
in Ethiopia or the Sanduks in the Comoros Islands. 
The analysis of numerous examples reveals positive correlations between the social and 
the ﬁnancial on several levels. Working with the poor and excluded naturally implies 
higher transaction costs, but it also allows MFIs to intervene where competition is 
less ﬁerce. Moreover, adapting services and economic and social beneﬁts to clients 
Social Performance in Microfinance, 
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means that risks are diversiﬁed, making products more competitive and reducing over-
indebtedness. Responsible behaviour by an MFI also builds trust between the MFI 
and its clients and reduces social tensions within both the MFI and the community. 
Hence, these measures can together lead in the medium term to increased client 
loyalty, a better rate of return, a reduction in transaction costs (as some will be covered 
by clients), improved opportunities for the community and greater social capital, an 
increased capacity for innovation etc.
The issue of social performance was highlighted by the appearance of critics who, in 
the wake of media coverage of microﬁnance, challenged it to demonstrate objectively 
that it was a sound tool for aiding economic and social development. Various initiatives 
worked on methods for assessing and managing social performance and today simple 
tools exist for assessing MFIs’ social performance in a practical and credible manner and 
for strengthening social performance management. To ensure coherence, the principal 
initiatives that created these instruments co-ordinated their efforts through working 
groups at global level (i.e. the Social Performance Task Force60 ) or at European level 
(i.e. the European Microﬁnance Platform’s working group on social performance61), and 
this collaboration was fruitful. MFIs’ perceptions of social performance assessment 
and management have progressed; they no longer simply consider these as a cost, 
but instead as an opportunity to develop sound and socially  responsible institutions. 
Combined assessment of ﬁnancial performance and social performance (through 
initiatives such as the database of  members of the ProsperA MFI network that uses 
CERISE’s Social Performance Indicator SPI tool62, for example) could be used to 
analyse the links between social performance and ﬁnancial performance and to verify 
the theory that these are compatible in the medium term. As an indication that this 
issue is recognised at sector-level, the global platform for information on microﬁnance, 
MIX Market, will soon complement its ﬁnancial performance indicators with social 
performance indicators.
This European Dialogue shows that investors are also in the process of taking this 
issue on board and are seeking to incorporate it into their decision-making by putting 
various mechanisms in place. In the appendix, the analysis by Micol Guarneri, from 
MicroFinanzas Rating, a rating agency proposing social ratings, also shows the 
60 http://www.microﬁnancegateway.org/resource_centers/socialperformance 
61 http://www.microﬁnance-platform.eu/ 
62 For more information on assessment, see the SPI (Social Performance Indicator) tool on Cerise’s 
web site, http://www.cerise-microﬁnance.org; ProsperA, the Alliance for the Promotion of Social 
Performance, is a network of practitioners who are concerned with social performance and work 
on tools for assessment (such as SPI tool , poverty assessment tools and impact analysis) and 
management (i.e. governance) in order to increase the impact of microﬁnance.
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involvement of the investors in this ﬁeld. At European level, efforts are being made to 
facilitate exchanges of experience and encourage joint reﬂection. This Dialogue forms 
part of this effort by analysing the various strategies and practices put in place by 
European investors. 
The studies cover a wide range of investors who are concerned with these issues: they 
differ in terms of size, maturity, intervention methods and geographic focus of their 
operations. 
The cases presented in this Dialogue cover almost half of microﬁnance investment 
funds recorded at the end of 2007, of which, we should remember, 50% are less 
than three years old63. First and foremost, they illustrate the range of size of investors. 
Giants such as EFSE with total outstanding loans of USD 200 million and Oikocredit 
with USD 198 million (the biggest funds after the Procredit holding) and more modest 
funds such as the SIDI with its portfolio of USD 10 million, are far removed from 
local funds with a few hundred thousand dollars of investments. They are no more 
homogeneous as regards geographic focus: SIDI concentrates 46% of its investments 
on Africa, while more generally, Eastern Europe and Latin America are the best served 
areas, far ahead of the rest of the world. The most common form of intervention is 
providing loans, normally in hard currency, although many funds provide a variety of 
services following the example of Oikocredit, SIDI and Incoﬁn, which devotes 35% of 
its investments to equity ﬁnance. This method of intervention is used, in three quarters 
of cases, when a new MFI is launched. Building an institution’s capital can also attract 
local investors.
Investors are seeking to include the concept of SP in their analyses and practices 
to ensure that they are carrying out their mission more effectively, i.e. supporting 
microﬁnance, improving living conditions for beneﬁciaries, reducing poverty and so 
on. The case studies presented show  that the investors concerned are aware that a 
professional and collaborative approach is essential to ensure and increase the positive 
impact of microﬁnance.
Each case study shows that investors are seeking on the one hand to better understand 
the objectives and actions of their partner MFIs in terms of their social mission through 
a process of collecting information (due diligence), in an attempt to understand the 
social dimension as a basis for their judgements. These tools and the resulting data 
should help them to decide their strategies (for example, which partners to work with, 
what services to offer and how to support MFIs). On the other hand, they are trying 
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63 See Reille, X. & Sananikone, O., 2007 (April). Microﬁnance Investment Vehicles, CGAP Brief, Washington 
D.C., 2 p. and Reille, X. & Forster, S., 2008 (February) Foreign Capital Investment in Microﬁnance - 
Balancing Social and Financial Returns, CGAP Focus Note N° 44,  Washington DC, 24p.
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to increase the visibility of their actions, either to their own ﬁnancers or in a desire 
to clarify their strategy within their organisation. Lastly, investors are able to use this 
information to support and strengthen their links with MFIs and improve the SP of 
their partners. This requires an in-depth and individualised analysis of results that 
necessitates appropriate expenditure.
Various measures have been presented: 
• One-time assessments: selection processes which cover the objectives and 
processes put in place by MFIs, especially with regards to their target group; 
consideration of social and environmental standards 
• Monitoring and reporting systems: selection of social performance indicators to be 
monitored over time; ﬁnancial incentives for fund managers; impact evaluations 
• Support to management: assistance, training and information for MFIs on these 
issues; trialling tools for managing and measuring social performance, etc.
The various articles describe autonomous and individualised strategies that have 
strengthened links between MFIs and investors in speciﬁc circumstances, or measures 
inspired by advances in the sector as described above to adapt processes to investors’ 
and their partners’ needs for information and actions. Each case study illustrates a 
process of research, trial, questioning and progressive adaptation, most often in close 
connection with feedback from partner MFIs. 
At this stage, no standardised common processes seem to have developed among 
investors. Although at the moment this demonstrates that investors are pursuing an 
innovative and proactive strategy, this could in time become a burden for MFIs, who would 
be subjected to as many different reporting procedures as they have partner investors. 
This therefore, presents investors with the major issue of eventual harmonisation: how 
can reporting procedures based on common indicators be combined, whilst maintaining 
an individualised relationship with each MFI in keeping with each investor’s strategy? 
MIX Market could be a ﬁrst step towards a ‘smaller common denominator’ on which 
each investor could base its own requests for information.
No measure presented at this stage has completely succeeded, and difﬁculties and 
constraints have been highlighted:  how is it possible to combine standardisation, 
comparisons and consideration of the different contexts in which interventions take 
place? How are investors to interpret information and use it in their relations with MFIs? 
How can it be ensured for both MFIs and funds that the notion of social performance 
is not ‘peripheral’ to their central activities and is not considered simply as a burden 
of additional expense? 
Investors have emphasised their wish to continue their ‘joint’ progress, by strengthening, 
both internally and with their partners, measures for managing social performance; by 
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pursuing, along with other international initiatives, attempts to standardise and deﬁne 
common tools; and by seeking to use MFIs’ results in terms of social performance to 
establish the speciﬁc terms of investments etc. The production of this special issue 
reﬂects this wish to exchange information, innovate and continue progress in order 
to increase the sector’s social impact on its clients. We would therefore like to take 
advantage of this conclusion to thank those involved for their availability, openness 
and willingness to participate and to share their knowledge and experience in order to 
better develop and pioneer initiatives.
Investors are increasingly incorporating the social (including environmental) dimension 
into their strategies and relationships with partners. However, investors must not 
conﬁne their activity to the MFIs with the best social performance, as the objective 
should be to raise the performance of all MFIs in order to improve impact. An investor’s 
social performance must not be reduced to the social performance of its partners and 
should take into consideration its own practices.
Points raised by European Dialogue, by the Cerise network’s experience with MFIs 
and a number of investors and analyses by Koenraad Verhagen  in article 2 allow us to 
identify some fundamental principles to be built on regarding the social performance 
of investment funds.
Based on the framework that the SPI tool uses to judge the social performance at the 
level of the MFIs64, we can start to assess the social performance of investors and 
attempt to analyse what makes a microﬁnance investment socially responsible.
Dimension 1: What are the target MFIs? Do investors target the leading MFIs in the 
sector (the 150-200 which concentrate access to investment funds) or do they adopt 
a deliberate policy of supporting smaller, more rural or developing MFIs, African MFIs, 
etc?
Dimension 2: Do the services provided respond to the needs of partner MFIs? Do 
investors offer a range of services: do they offer mainly short term loans, or do they also 
provide long term loans, loans at concessional rates, equity investments, guarantee 
funds and innovative services that for example encourage the development of local 
reﬁnancing markets (such as interbank loans, guarantees), etc? Do they respond to the 
needs of MFIs by offering for example loans in local currency rather than in euros or 
dollars? As CGAP states, microﬁnance will develop in its local market and its future lies 
in local intermediation rather than in massive recourse to loans at international level. 
Social Performance in Microfinance,
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64 A reminder of the four dimensions of SPI that inspired the deﬁnitions of the Social Performance Task 
Force: 1) targeting of the poor and excluded, 2) adaptation of services, 3) client beneﬁts and 4) the 
MFI’s social responsibility (see http://www.cerise-microﬁnance.org).
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Do they ensure that their services are suitable?
Dimension 3: What are the beneﬁts for MFIs? Do investors make sure that their services 
allow MFIs to build their capacity: through better access to local resources (mobilisation 
of savings in particular), but also through technical assistance and training that enables 
the sector to become more professional, resulting in increased social impact for clients 
and better governance for the MFIs: Are these major challenges for the sector in the 
future?
Dimension 4: What is the investor’s social responsibility? What attention do investors pay 
to the social orientation and/or (expected) social performance of MFIs in the selection 
and evaluation processes (due diligence)? Do investors monitor and encourage the 
social performance of their partners, in particular when they are involved in the MFI’s 
governance? Do they take account of ‘social risks’ - the risks that social objectives 
will not be achieved or that actions taken will also produce negative effects? How 
transparent are their policies and practices? To what extent do they participate in 
international dialogue and debates on topics relating to social performance in order to 
promote and strengthen tools and methods and their correct use?
Other questions could also be explored, with related indicators.  However, this list 
shows that although signiﬁcant progress has been made in recent years to develop an 
appropriate format for MFIs, a complete framework for assessing the social performance 
of investors and donors, rewarding innovative approaches, rural outreach, etc. is yet to 
be drawn up.
Measuring and managing the social performance of MFIs helps them to fulﬁl their 
mission and increases their impact on target groups (especially the most disadvantaged). 
Some investors are now making this a criterion in their decisions and are using existing 
practices and research on this issue to develop decision-making tools. Today, social 
performance assessment is recognised as a completely separate and technically valid 
area of inclusive ﬁnance. Challenges still remain in terms of standardising approaches 
and the introduction of tools that are suitable and speciﬁc to the ‘new class of assets’ 
represented by microﬁnance to further improve its social performance.
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How do the rating agencies see the role of the investors in promoting social perfor-
mance for the Microﬁnance sector?
The increasing amount of public and private resources invested in the microﬁnance 
sector together with some recent very criticised experiences (e.g. Compartamos) has 
put pressure on the sector to better understand the social aspects of microﬁnance, 
intended as the effective translation of an institution’s mission into practice and 
achievement of the main recognized social goals. This trend has led to an increase in 
attention by social investors towards the concept of Social Performance Management 
(SPM).
In addition to choosing the term ‘social investor’, the mere fact of investing in 
microﬁnance is no longer sufﬁcient to demonstrate that one is a real socially responsible 
investor. 
Many social investors are nowadays asked by their ﬁnanciers not only to give evidence 
of ﬁnancial returns of investments but also of actual social returns as well, aligned with 
their own social mission.
In this scenario, social investors and donors can (and should feel bound to) play a 
signiﬁcant role not only in the dissemination of social performance concepts and tools 
but also in promoting the practice of SPM at the MFI level, strengthening the capacities 
of their partners to put in place effective SP monitoring and management systems.
Apart from the genuine interest and willingness of a still limited number of MFIs, We 
believe that social investors are currently the key drivers (together with donors of course) 
for the effective dissemination and mainstreaming of SP in reporting requirements on 
a broader scale, thus resulting in  improved social performance transparency in the 
microﬁnance sector.
This belief is conﬁrmed by our experience in the provision of our social rating services. 
Some MFIs (generally quite big and well developed) have actually covered themselves 
for the cost of a social rating, but in most cases the actual drivers for the dissemination 
of this tool are public and private social investors and donors. What are the reasons for 
this? I believe there is a genuine desire by social investors to effectively meet their social 
expectations and missions and to work with MFIs that can actually have an impact on 
the lives of their clients. In reality, some social investors ask for our social rating not 
only in order to receive a reliable independent assessment of the social performance 
of a partner MFI, but also with a view of introducing social performance management 
and monitoring systems in the partner organizations on a continuous basis (e.g. social 
rating as the ﬁrst step to design SPM projects). These investors consider that it is of 
Social Performance in Microfinance,
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vital importance to strengthen the capacity of their partner MFIs in SPM since it will 
enable them to better understand the characteristics, needs and preferences of their 
clients, enabling them to offer high quality ﬁnancial products that better respond to 
the needs of the microentrepreneur clients. Moreover, the establishment of effective 
SPM systems within their partner MFIs in turn gives the investor the opportunity to 
effectively demonstrate to their own ﬁnancier the actual impact of the investments  on 
the lives of the poor.
I believe that the support of social investors in this kind of concrete action as well 
as the strong interest they show in tools like social ratings are proof of their real 
involvement and commitment to the social mission. 
The strong interest in our social rating services among social investors stems from the 
fact that the social rating is considered to be a tool which meets several objectives: 
• as a reporting tool to inform external stakeholders of the social returns of their 
investments and make allocation decisions on the basis of the social performance 
considerations;
•  as a diagnostic instrument highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of the social 
performance dimensions and enabling the identiﬁcation of strategic priorities and 
areas that require interventions, thereby facilitating subsequent possible capacity 
building  initiatives. This is mainly true for equity investors wanting to establish long 
term relationships with MFIs. This long term perspective allows for a constructive 
dialogue leading to collaborative projects (MFIs-investors) aimed at proposing 
processes for the design and implementation of SPM strategies and systems;
•  as a way to facilitate the identiﬁcation of formats and tools for ongoing monitoring 
of the social performance of social investors partner MFIs, identifying and deﬁning 
simple standards and a set of indicators for reporting;
•  to increase social transparency in the MF sector. It is probably too soon, but I 
think that we can already observe a trend among investors towards giving priority 
investment status to MFIs rated as strong social performers, thus making them 
eligible for ﬁnancing and equity investments under more favourable terms and 
conditions (for example: reduction of interest rates).
Are the examples from European Dialogue only exceptions in the microﬁnance sector?
For the time being, the examples shown in this publication seem to be exceptions to the 
norm (even though there are many more examples not included), yet I am convinced 
that a generalization is possible. In order to make this possible, it is necessary to 
establish standards and to simplify criteria for the identiﬁcation and collection of social 
performance indicators to be reported  by the MFIs, while leaving to the rating providers 
the task of more detailed SP analysis. Of course, a constraint to the important role of 
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social investor is the current limited transparency of self evaluations undertaken by the 
MFIs (lack of standardized format for reporting, poor diffusion of best practices,etc.). 
This limitation yields a further role to social rating which acts as an external evaluation 
and a way to promote agreed-upon standards, towards a consensus on what to measure, 
deﬁnitions, etc. and an improved transparency in reporting.
What is the opinion of the MFIs? How do they see the involvement of the investors 
in the issue of Social Performance? What can be expected? Is it just for communica-
tion, or can it improve the impact on the clients?
Apart from possible exceptions (MFIs with a poor transparency culture or MFIs not 
willing to communicate about their real target or priorities and/or willing to dissimulate 
their mission drift), this trend is normally positively accepted by MFIs.
This is mainly a consequence of:
• MFIs’ willingness to align to social investors’ expectations to access more funds at 
better conditions;
•  MFIs’ willingness to be better perceived by local governments and to improve 
microﬁnance acceptance in some countries (Ecuador case);
•  but also MFIs’ real willingness to improve their SPM systems and to meet their 
original social objective in a situation where they are subject to an increasing 
pressure to achieve ﬁnancial objectives and self-sustainability. We observe a rising 
interest from microﬁnance institutions with a strong social focus, which are more 
and more willing to pay for services like social rating and to genuinely commit to 
putting in place strategies and systems for the achievement of social goals.
Of course, the marketing and communication aspect has also had its effects and MFIs 
may be interested in presenting themselves as more socially-oriented than they actually 
are only for fund raising and/or image purposes.
To avoid this, the following is particularly important:
•  the role of social rating as an external validation has to be acknowledged and 
recognized;
•  MFIs’ awareness about social performance management and measurement has to 
be enhanced;
•  MFIs must not only be asked for reporting but also assisted to put in place SPM 
systems, involving them fully so as to enhance ownership of the tool;
•  case studies demonstrating a higher general/ﬁnancial performance of 
socially performing MFIs and the beneﬁts of social performance need to be 
disseminated.
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INTERNET LINKS TO DIFFERENT INITIATIVES
ACCION: www.accion.org 
Alterﬁn: www.alterﬁn.be/en/index.html 
CERISE: www.cerise-microﬁnance.org 
CGAP: www.cgap.org 
EFSE: www.efse.lu
e-MFP: www.microﬁnance-platform.eu 
FMO: http://www.fmo.nl/smartsite.dws?id=531
GRI, Triple Bottom Line and Microﬁnance, see www.tblmicroﬁnance.blogspot.com
Imp-Act: www.imp-act.org
Incoﬁn: www.incoﬁn.be 
Mix Market: www.mixmarket.org
Oïkocredit: www.oikocredit.org/site/en
PPI: www.microﬁnance.com/#Poverty_Scoring   
SEEP Network: www.seepnetwork.org 
Sidi: www.sidi.fr/english.php 
Social Performance Task Force: www.microﬁnancegateway.org/resource_centers/
socialperformance
Swiss Intercooperation: www.intercooperation.ch/ﬁnance
USAID-IRIS PAT: www.povertytools.org
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